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RECIPROCITY AND THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS
BERNARD E. HARVITH*
The Jones Chemical Company is considering its next purchase of the
cardboard barrels in which it packages much of its output. The sales-
man from Smith Paper Products suggests that his firm be given prefer-
ence, since it purchases large quantities of chemicals from Jones. He
even hints that those purchases will be increased if Jones will make the
"right" decision in regard to its orders. This prediction proves to be
correct, after Jones purchases its barrels from Smith.
These firms are engaging in a common business practice which has
come to be called "reciprocity." This modern industrial version of the
ancient practice of "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours" may
seem to be an innocuous and almost inevitable concomitant of the rela-
tionships which develop between firms having frequent dealings with
each other. However, careful analysis indicates that reciprocity may
have harmful effects upon competition and may violate several existing
antitrust statutes. Once these conclusions are accepted, even thornier
problems arise concerning the economic desirability and legality under
the present law of mergers which increase a firm's potential for induc-
ing reciprocity. Moreover, in regard to both such mergers and reci-
procity itself, areas of doubt exist for which federal legislation seems
to be the appropriate remedy.
I. RECIPROCITY-DEFINITION AND BusuSS PRACTICE
Reciprocity may be defined broadly as action by one business entity
benefiting a second, independent business entity, in return for action by
the latter benefiting the former. However, for purposes of antitrust
analysis, the term "reciprocity" should be confined to situations of
reciprocal buying and selling of goods and/or services, and the term
will be so used throughout this article. While some other writers have
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. The first draft of this
article was prepared for a seminar on Law and Economics taught by Professor Leo J.
Raskind at New York University School of Law in the summer of 1964. The author
would like to express hig gratitude to Professor Raskind, to Professor Norman Dorsen
of New York University School of Law for suggesting the topic, and to New York
University and the Ford Foundation for making possible the author's studies last
summer.
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attempted a more generic usage,1 an analysis of cases cited in connec-
tion with such a view shows that actually they deal with reciprocal
buying and selling or examine situations somewhat different, in eco-
nomic effect and competitive impact, from reciprocal purchasing. 2 Per-
' Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 69, 71 and n.13 (1964); Note, Reciprocity-Antitrust Violation By Natural Re-
action, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 832, 833, 848-49, 851-52 (1964). "'Business reciprocity'
may be described generally as the practice whereby independent firms make mutual
concessions, in any form, which promote the business interests of each." Id. at 833.
2 Socony Mobil Oil Co., 56 F.T.C. 1209 (1960) (order dismissing complaint), in-
volved a supplier's furnishing buyers with expensive equipment for dispensing its prod-
ucts, such equipment to be paid for by crediting a specified discount on each unit of its
products purchased. Carnation Co., 60 F.T.C. 1274 (1962) (complaint dismissed),
examined alleged attempts by suppliers to induce exclusive dealing by providing equip-
ment, loans, services, discounts, rebates, and allowances to dealers. ABC Vending
Corp. 3 TRADE REG. REP., f 16,880 (1964) (initial order to cease and desist), sub noma.
ABC Consolidated Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP., 1 17,109 (1964) (stipulated order),
evaluated a motion picture distributor's loans, advances of funds, and commission pay-
ments to theater owners. R. H. Macy & Co., 60 F.T.C. 1249 (1962), condemned a de-
partment store's demanding that its suppliers contribute to the cost of the store's 100th
anniversary celebration. In United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), the Justice Department alleged a conspiracy to restrain competition in and
monopolize "'the cream of the business' of investment banking." Id. at 629. One ele-
ment alleged, but dismissed for lack of proof, was that "reciprocity" was used by each
investment banking firm in giving business to and receiving business from the other
firms and
that over a period of time the profits from such participations are substantially
equivalent, with due allowance for differentials in prestige and underwriting strength.
If substantiated, these allegations would indicate some systematic and continuous
arrangement between the defendants to pay one another off in return for the alleged
agreement to defer to one another as 'traditional bankers.'
Id. at 633. No details are supplied, but the so-called "reciprocity" here would seem to be
(1) buying-selling reciprocity, in the sense that what are exchanged are preferred posi-
tions in supplying additional financing services "bought" by the firm "giving business"
to the other firms; or (2) a division of markets, if what is meant is that certain types
of financing or ventures are allocated to particular, "traditional" firms; or (3) a refusal
to deal or price discrimination, if what is meant is that in forming an investment syndi-
cate, one of the defendants would turn only to the other defendants or would not let
outsiders in on as favorable terms as those offered to the other defendants. It should be
obvious that this case (1) does not involve any new use of reciprocity or (2) applied
that term to conduct which requires, and which receives, a different analysis. United
States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 916(1951), examined allegations that the supplier defendants were to furnish financing to
the transit operator defendants in return for the latter firms' purchasing substantially
all their requirements of certain items from the supplier defendants. Kansas City Star
Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957),
involved an allegation of buy-sell reciprocity, in which a newspaper pressured one of
its cloth suppliers into purchasing its advertising from the newspaper, and to cease
advertising in a competing newspaper. In Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F.
Supp. 103, 109 (E.D. La. 1964), buy-sell reciprocity by a shipper of grain selling
fleeting and switching services to barge carriers of grain was alleged but not proved.
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), reversing 126
F. Supp. 235 (N.D.Ill. 1954), concerned du Pont's use of its stock ownership in General
Motors to influence GM to buy automobile fabric and finishes from du Pont. See 353
U.S. at 593-609. Similar purchasing was also alleged, below, to arise from ownership
of stock in United States Rubber. 126 F.Supp. at 124-34.
California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937), dealt with buy-sell reciprocity. See
text accompanying note 68-77 infra. Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Cooperative Ass'n,
202 F.Supp. 481 (D.Ore. 1962), involved a milk processor, wholesaler, and retailer
which made loans to milk retailers and, until the loans were repaid, demanded the
debtors purchase all their requirements of milk from the defendant.
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haps the most relevant distinguishing criterion is the permanency of the
relationship created. For example, when suppliers finance bus com-
panies in return for the transit operators' agreement to purchase re-
quirements of certain goods,' a much more unbreakable arrangement
is created than when A buys from B because B buys from A. It is very
difficult to throw out a big creditor. Moreover, the very authors who
support the broader usage admit that often the courts did not mention
the word "reciprocity" in the cases cited.4 Finally, it is at least highly
arguable that some of the practices sought to be brought under the
reciprocity umbrella are more closely akin to other antitrust concepts,
such as tying agreements" or vertical integration.6
Most frequently reciprocal buying and selling operates between two
firms and/or their subsidiaries,7 although it may occur in a three-
cornered fashion,' with A buying from B because B buys from C which
buys from A. The arrangement may have more than three corners.
Another variant is chain reciprocity.' Here A buys from a supplier of
B, B buys from A, and the supplier gives B a better deal in return for
B's inducing A to patronize the supplier. Alternatively, A may buy
from a supplier of the supplier, and the reciprocal arrangement involves
3United States v. National City Lines, supra note 2.
'Hale & Hale, supra note 1, at 71 n.13, noting that the word "reciprocity" was not
used by the courts in United States v. National City Lines and Curly's Dairy v. Dairy
Cooperative Ass'n, cited in note 2 supra, Note, Reciprocity-Antitrust Violation By
Natural Reaction, supra note 1, at 851, making similar comments in regard to the
Socony-Mobil, Carnation, ABC Vending, and R. H. Macy cases, all cited; note 2 supra.
r Cases where a supplier furnished equipment or financing, as well as goods, to
retailers are more analogous to tying contracts than reciprocity because, like tying,
the situations presented involved use of power in a sales market to increase sales.
Reciprocity results in the transfer of power from a buying market to a selling market.
See the Socony-Mobil, Carnation, ABC Vending, National City Lines, and Curly's
Dairy cases, all cited in note 2 supra. The R. H. Macy case arguably is similar to
tying imposed by the purchaser of the combination package, but rebates are a much
more apt analogy.
6 All of the cases involving a supplier's furnishing of financing to buyers are more
closely akin to vertical integration than to reciprocity because a relationship with a
major creditor is much more permanent than a reciprocal buying arrangement. See
the Carnation, ABC Vending, National City Lines, and Curly's Dairy cases, all cited
in note 2 supra.
7 Eg., see Reciprocity-Dangerous Selling Tool Winning New Users!, SALEs MAN-
AGE ENT, May 20, 1960, p. 40. It is notable that many articles on reciprocity do not
even discuss it except as sales-purchasing reciprocity between two firms.
8 Id. at 44; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L.
Rav. 873, 878 (1964). In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F.Supp. 530 (W.D.
Pa. 1963), aff'd 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963), a conglomerate merger was attacked as
creating the potential for three-cornered reciprocity. A large purchaser of steel wished
to acquire three manufacturers of coal mining equipment. Since steel producers pur-
chase large amounts of coal, the Justice Department feared that the steel purchaser
would persuade its sellers, the steel producers, to persuade their sellers, coal producers,
to buy their equipment from these manufacturers of coal mining machinery. This
case is discussed at note 142 infra.
9 Ibid; Mandell, Reciprocity-Industry's Secret Sales Weapon, DuN's REV. AND
MODERN INusraY, Sept. 1960, p. 32, 33-34.
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two links in the supply chain as well as A and B. However, the ex-
amples used here will deal with two-party reciprocity, since it is the
usual kind and produces the same harmful effects and has the same
possible justifications as do more complex forms.
Reciprocity is a widely used practice among business firms of all
sizes in the United States" except in the defense and consumer goods
industries." Larger businesses appear to use it more often and more
successfully than do smaller ones. 2 Reciprocity is a policy about
which most firms are reluctant to talk. 8 A reciprocity policy may be
implemented in various ways. Two firms may agree to buy and sell on
a reciprocal basis. The agreement may be the result of their joint de-
sires, or it may be forced upon one party by the other. There may be no
agreement, and one firm may use its reciprocity power by threatening
to discontinue purchases from the other. There may be actual threats,
polite hints, or no direct communication between firms, the more pow-
erful firm merely letting it be known that a reciprocal purchasing pol-
icy will be followed.' Some firms actually have their purchasing agents
and salesmen call upon other firms at the same time.'
Widespread use of reciprocity was clearly shown in a survey of pur-
chasing agents conducted by Purchasing magazine in 1961.1' Fifty-one
per cent of the agents reported that reciprocity, or trade relations as it
is more euphemistically called, was a factor in buyer-seller relations in
their companies. This percentage rose to seventy-eight per cent for
purchasing agents whose companies' annual sales volume exceeded
fifty million dollars. The percentage was one hundred per cent in the
chemical, petroleum, iron and steel, and certain other industries dealing
in basic raw materials.
Within a firm, the decision to adopt a reciprocity policy usually re-
quires certain changes: increasing the volume and speed of exchanging
10 Sloane, Reciprocity: Where Does the PA. Stand? PURCHASING, No. 20, 1961,
pp. 70, 71 ; Ammer, Realistic Reciprocity, 40 HARv. Bus. R-v. 116 (1962).
11 Sloane, supra note 10, at 71-72; Mandell, supra note 9, at 32.
12 Sloane, supra note 10, at 72.
13Id. at 74.
14 Some of the forms of reciprocity are described in Hausman, supra note 8, at 877-
78; Reciprocity-Dangerous Selling Tool Winning New Users!, supra note 7. See
generally, Sloane, supra note 10; Reciprocity Smirks Behind the Sales Smile, Chem-
ical Week, Nov. 22, 1958, p. 38; What's Good and Bad About Reciprocal Buying?,
Industrial Management, July 1962, p. 118; Mandell, supra note 9; Murr, The Ethics
of Trade Relations, in AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSoCiATIoN RESEARCH BULLETIN
No. 19, TRADE RELATIONS DE'INED: THE CONCEPT, LEGAL AsPECTs, ETHICAL PROB-
LEMIS 12 (1962).
15 Sloane, supra, note 10, at 73.
16 Id. at 70-73. The statistics cited in the text appear in a chart summarizing the
results of the survey. Id. at 76-77.
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information between the sales and purchasing departments; centraliz-
ing purchasing in order to accumulate large volume orders, which pro-
vide the best leverage for reciprocity; and, normally, the establishment
of a trade relations department, or some similarly named section, which
will supervise these changes and administer the reciprocity system. '
Despite its widespread use, a reciprocity policy, at least in the view
of some writers, 8 brings dangers as well as benefits to the company
which adopts it. Reciprocity creates a false impression of stability
about future orders; the other party can stop them whenever it is will-
ing to risk losing the orders it receives in return." Salesmen become
lazy and tend to neglect the firms with which their company has recipro-
cal dealings.20 The quality of their selling efforts directed towards non-
reciprocating firms may also be decreased, since the salesmen are
assured of commissions from the reciprocating firms. Reciprocity, when
handled by top management, as is frequently the case, becomes a
burden on the time and energies of the most important officers of the
firm.2 Demands for reciprocity may be taken by some other firms to
mean that the demanding firm is not confident that its goods can com-
pete with others.2 Finally, a company may pay higher prices or take
poorer quality goods in order to purchase from a firm which will, in
return, purchase from it.23
What looks like reciprocity may merely reflect a firm's convictions
about the quality of the products sold by firms with which it does busi-
ness, especially if the caliber of the product produced or services pro-
vided by that firm depend upon, or affect, the quality of the goods pro-
17 Id. at 73; Murr, supra note 14, at 15; Reciprocity--Dangerous Selling Tool Win-
ning New Usersl supra note 7, at 41.
18 The critics include Adam Smith who opposed the use of reciprocity as a national
or corporate purchasing policy.
The restraints upon the wine trade in Great Britain ... favour the wine trade of
Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is said, indeed, are
better customers for our manufacturers than the French, and should therefore be
encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their custom, it is pretended, we
should give them ours. The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are thus erected
into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire; for it is the most underling
tradesmen only who make it a rule to employ chiefly their own customers. A great
trader purchases his goods always where they are cheapest and best, without regard
to any little interest of this kind.
SMTH, AN INQUImr I To THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 460(Modem Library ed. 1937). For more modem criticisms, see authorities cited in notes
19-23 infra.
19 Redprocit.Dangerous Selling Tool Winning New Users!, supra note 7, at 42.
20 Ibd; Ammer, upra note 10, at 122.21 Reciprocity---Dangerota Selling Tool Winning New Users!, supra note 7, at 42.
22 Ibid; Ammer, supra note 10, at 122.2 3 Mandell, supra note 9, at 34.
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duced by those other firms. For example, the head of a famous adver-
tising agency, David Ogilvy, writes:
I always use my clients' products. This is not toadyism, but elementary
good manners. Almost everything I consume is manufactured by one of
my clients....
And why not, pray tell? Are these not the finest goods and services on
earth? I think they are, and that is why I advertise them."2
However mannerly and proper such sentiments are when applied to
personal purchases, emotional conviction as to the quality of goods or
services can be dangerous when these goods or services are utilized by
the company whose officers hold such beliefs. Such commitment to
certain suppliers can lead to their company's missing improvements
made by other firms. Ultimately this failure could lead to purchase of
inferior or obsolete goods and capital equipment, which will lower the
quality of the firm's own products and services. Therefore, such intel-
lectual bondage, often reinforced by personal friendships between
officers of reciprocating firms, is another danger encountered when a
firm adopts a reciprocity policy.
At least one writer" and one appellate court26 have worried about so-
called "psychological reciprocity": the situation where a firm has so
much purchasing power that its suppliers will act as if the firm has a
reciprocity policy, even if there has been no indication of one. Suppliers
tend to buy from the big purchaser of their goods just because it is a
good idea to do everything possible to keep his good will. However,
"psychological reciprocity" is a term requiring further refinement. If
the big purchaser responds by increasing its purchases from suppliers
buying from it, the big firm has adopted a reciprocity policy and has
moved out of the "psychological reciprocity" area. If the big firm
does not change its purchasing pattern, suppliers have no way of
knowing if the status quo would be maintained if they bought else-
where. This is the true "psychological reciprocity" situation; perhaps
it could be termed "negative psychological reciprocity," since the sup-
pliers' conduct is aimed, not at increasing the big firm's purchases from
them, but at inducing the big firm not to reduce those purchases. In an
expanding economy it is more precise to say that "negative psychologi-
cal reciprocity" is aimed at inducing the big firm to continue to pur-
24 OGILVY, CONFESSIONS OF AN ADVERTISING MAN 61-62 (1963).
25 Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 ANTi-
TRUST BULL. 93, 98-99 (1964).
26 United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3rd Cir. 1963).
[VoL. 40:133
ANTITRUST AND RECIPROCITY
chase the present percentage of its total requirements of an item from
a supplier. Obviously, total units purchased will increase as the output
of the big firm grows. But as long as the percentages remain constant,
in the absence of other evidence, it is impossible to impute to the big
corporation the pursuit of a reciprocity policy. The purchasing power
which induces "negative psychological reciprocity" may be denomi-
nated "negative psychological reciprocity power," just as the power
that enables a firm to operate a reciprocity policy may be termed "reci-
procity power."
II. EcoNomic EFFECTS
The economic effects of reciprocity depend upon the power and prod-
ucts of the firms doing the reciprocating, as well as upon the nature of
the markets in which they operate and the competitors which they
face.27 Essentially, reciprocity involves the transfer of power in one
market to another market. The large, diversified company has greater
buying power, and therefore more power to demand that those who sell
to it also buy from it. It also offers more products so there is a much
greater possibility that companies which sell to it will be in the market
for some of its goods. In other words, such a company has greater
power in the market in which it buys and greater opportunity to trans-
fer that power effectively to markets in which it sells. The small com-
pany selling one or a few products has less purchasing power and fre-
quently does not sell any product desired by those who sell to it. Thus,
reciprocity favors the large, diversified corporation. Such a firm has
even greater reciprocity power if it is the only large buyer of a certain
product, or is one of a few such purchasers.
The extent of the large firm's reciprocity power depends not only on
its size relative to any one of the other buyers, but also on the size of its
purchases when compared with the aggregate purchases by all other
buyers. The largest buyer might have only a tiny percentage of the
purchases. This would seem to be a rare situation, however, and gener-
ally the large, diversified firms will have sufficient purchasing power to
enforce reciprocity to at least some degree against the companies from
which those large firms buy. In almost every case the large firm will be
more successful at the reciprocity game than the smaller purchasers.
27 The following analysis incorporates a substantial part of and attempts to build
upon two previous analyses of the economic effects of reciprocity: Hausman, supra
note 8, at 879-80; Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocty and the Size of Firms, 30
U. CHL J. Bus. 73 (1957). An analysis somewhat similar to that expr ssed 
here ap-
peared in Note, supra note 1, at 835-42, but unfortunately was not available to the
author until after the first draft of this article had been finished.
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An exception occurs when the other party to the reciprocity adopts and
is able to maintain a policy of buying in a ratio to its sales, thereby
giving all its customers a chance to sell to it in proportion to their
purchases from it.28
Situations involving reciprocity are many and varied. Here it might
be well to examine three: (1) X Corporation, which carries on a con-
tinual course of selling to Y Corporation is making an initial or inde-
pendent purchase of the goods Y Corporation sells, an independent
purchase being one which is not part of a course of dealing; (2) X and
Y Corporations each purchase regularly the type of goods that the other
sells; (3) the same situation as in (2) except that at the beginning of
the reciprocity between X and Y each offers its goods to the other at
prices and quality levels matching those available from any competing
seller.
(1) When a corporation, X, is making its first purchase of a type of
goods, or is making a purchase independent in the sense that it is for
equipping a new plant, for example, and is a one-shot deal, not soon to
be repeated, reciprocity will give a large, continuing purchaser from X
the advantage in making the sale to X if that large purchaser sells the
goods X needs. The effect of reciprocity is to make it more difficult for
smaller companies to make the sale to X, even if they can match or even
slightly beat the price and quality offered by the large purchaser. Reci-
procity does not absolutely bar the smaller firms from making the sale.
It merely increases the price and/or quality differential required before
X will choose their goods over those of the large purchaser from X.
Clearly, at some point the value of a lower price or higher quality goods
will outweigh the risk to X of losing the business of the large customer.
The word "risk" must be used in this analysis to take into account the
fact that the large purchaser, whether or not it has attempted to pres-
sure X overtly, may not transfer its business if X buys from another
firm. The large purchaser from X, before transferring its business, will
consider, if its officers are rational men, the costs to itself of changing
suppliers. Such costs will take account of the prices and qualities of
goods offered by X's competitors, as well as the reciprocity power to be
gained in regard to the new recipient of its orders. Also, in certain
industries a change in the source of supply for certain goods or mate-
rials may well require some retooling costs.
So far, no consideration has been given to the effect of the large pur-
2 8 An example of a firm using such a proportionate reciprocity policy is described
in Sloane, supra note 10, at 74.
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chaser's reciprocity power upon another large firm which might try to
sell X the same goods offered by the large purchaser. If the second
large firm is also a large purchaser from X, X will have to weigh the
risks of losing its sales to each of the large firms, as well as the prices
and qualities of goods offered by each. They will compete in reciprocity
whether or not the second large firm practices reciprocity. If the second
large firm is not now a customer of X, X must balance the possibility
that a purchase from that firm might make it a future customer against
the risk of losing the present large purchaser's business. Consideration
must also be given to the prices and qualities offered by the two firms.
In evaluating the risk of losing present business and the possibilities
of gaining future business, by purchasing from a small or large firm to
which X does not presently sell, X must consider the size and frequency
of the orders each firm might place with X, as well as the future stabil-
ity and prospects of each firm.
(2) Reciprocity generally has the greatest effect where each of two
companies continually purchases sizable quantities of the goods which
the other sells. If the companies believe in reciprocity, and not all com-
panies do,29 the potential for increasing sales will induce each to pur-
chase from the other, assuming that neither has a competitor with
which the other could work out a more advantageous reciprocity ar-
rangement. Once reciprocal purchasing has begun, the natural inertia
of men, personal relationships between officers of the two companies,
the possible need for retooling, and all the other factors that oppose
changes of suppliers will reinforce the purchasing power underlying the
reciprocal relationships. Therefore, where continual courses of dealing
are involved, the effect of reciprocity on subsequent orders is piled on
top of other factors. Small competitors frequently will have difficulty
offering goods whose prices and qualities equal those of the larger firms.
The problems of small competitors in overcoming the added handicap
imposed by reciprocity are severe in regard to initial or independent
orders. When there is a course of dealing plus reciprocity, the handicap
is increased.
(3) It may be argued that reciprocity has no effect when the goods
X Corporation purchased from a reciprocal buyer from X are equal in
price and quality to any available from the seller's competitors. Pro-
fessor Handier has written:
Everyone agrees that other things being equal, buyers will favor suppliers
29See id. at 76-77.
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who are customers and that it would be contrary to human nature for this
not to occur. The rub is when other things are not equal.
Is it not absurd to prevent me from patronizing a doctor who happens
to be a client of my law office? Certainly I am a fool if I put my health in
the hands of a quack merely because he is a client. But what is ethically
or socially reprehensible about reciprocity where this is no sacrifice of
efficiency, no disparity of price, quality or service, and where there is no
coercion? Conversely, how can one justify coercive reciprocal dealings
which impair the efficiency of business operations and have a substantial
adverse effect on competition ?3o
But this analysis errs in assuming a static situation. When a competi-
tive seller lowers his price or raises his quality sufficiently to overcome
other factors acting against X's switching suppliers, in a competitive
market X would change over to him. But in a reciprocity situation X
will wait for the greater price or quality differential necessary to also
compensate X for the risk that X will lose the sales it now makes to the
reciprocal buyer, discounted by the value of the possibility X will
secure the prospective new supplier as a customer.
Therefore, in all these examples, which seem to illustrate the more
typical situations, the effect of reciprocity is to impose an additional
hurdle which must be overcome before a purchaser will buy from the
seller offering the best price or quality. This result is forthcoming where
the reciprocity is three-cornered or of the chain variety. But in any
realistic view of the practices of businessmen, recognition must be
given to the fact that de rainimis or short-term price or quality differ-
entials, and even sizable and continued differentials offered by an un-
known or unreliable firm, may not overcome the sustained, trusted
prices and quality of goods offered by long established firms.
Theories of pure competition require that purchasers buy at the
lowest price or buy the highest quality at the given price, in order that
the purchasers maximize their return by cutting their costs. Then com-
petition in the market in which these purchasers sell will act to lower
the prices at which they sell or to increase the quality of the goods
which they sell. Ultimately, consumers will benefit by receiving goods
at lower prices or of higher quality. Reciprocity, while not an absolute
bar to sales going to the firm offering the lowest prices or best quality,
does increase the differential necessary between its prices or quality
and those offered by firms with which the buyer has or could have
reciprocal dealings of a larger or more reliable nature than those it has
3o Handler, Emnerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ven-
tures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433, 436-37 (1963).
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or could have with this most competitive seller. In many cases the seller
offering the lowest price or highest quality will not be able to go far
enough to create this increased differential. Therefore, the firm with
greater reciprocal possibilities will make the sale although it is not the
most efficient producer offering the best price or the best quality at a
given price. Reciprocity, then, does not promote the efficiency neces-
sary to give consumers the best goods at the lowest prices. This foster-
ing of inefficiency extends beyond any individual sale. Through fa-
voring large, diversified firms, even if they are less efficient than small
ones, reciprocity tends to drive the small firms out of the market. Thus
reciprocity interferes with "the process of competitive selection,"'" the
economic aspect of Darwin's principle of the survival of the fittest.
In addition to hurting competitors of the reciprocating firms and de-
nying consumers the benefits of maximum efficiency in the economy,
reciprocity also adversely affects potential competitors of the recipro-
cating firms. This harm is caused because the added hurdle to securing
a company's business deters entry of new competitors of those selling
to that company. This decrease in ease of entry also hurts consumers,
since it reduces the protection the threat of entry provides against the
extreme exercise of oligopoly powers.82
Another economic aspect of reciprocity is that its desirability as a
corporate policy will be increased if the goods whose reciprocal pur-
chase the practicing firm will demand from other firms are ones in
which that firm has high fixed costs and low variable costs, and the firm
has unused productive capacity to make those goods, and if the goods
which that firm would purchase in exchange for other firms' purchases
of its goods are such that their cost can be treated, for federal tax pur-
poses, as operating expenses rather than expenditures for capital equip-
ment."5
81 Hausman, supra note 8, at 879.8 2 Id. at 880.
3 3 High fixed cost, low variable cost, and unused capacity in regard to the goods it
will sell means that the firm can manufacture those goods at a low cost relative to their
selling price if cost is viewed as the additional expenditure necessitated by the manu-
facture of these goods, and not as the average cost of all goods of this type produced by
the firm. Therefore, a high proportion of the sales price of the added goods sold through
reciprocity will be profit. For example, if the variable cost is only 100 per unit and the
goods sell for 50¢ per unit, there will be a pre-tax profit of 40 per unit. However,
part of this 40¢ may have to go to pay for the additional cost of goods purchased, if
reciprocity requires purchasing more goods or goods at higher prices than would be
necessary if no reciprocity policy were in effect. Assume this added cost when spread
over all additional units sold through reciprocity, comes to 150 per unit. This leaves 250
per unit as pre-tax profit. But the matter is not quite that simple. If the 400 per unit is
profit, and the 150 additional purchasing expenses was for capital equipment, all of that
150 will not be deductible as an expense in the current year on the corporation's federal
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A sound and useful evaluation of reciprocity's economic effects will
be possible only if it is realized that pure competition, while useful as
an analytic tool to indicate the impact of reciprocity, is never found in
the business world. It is time to return to reality 4 and examine reci-
procity's effects against a grid composed of the attainable economic
conduct and structure deemed desirable. Economists call this conduct
and structure "workable competition," a term identified with the writ-
ings of J. M. Clark. 5
Workable competition, like the pure competitive model, requires that
no firm be able to control prices in or bar entry into an industry."
Pure competition requires that (1) all sellers in a market make per-
fectly interchangeable products and that all buyers and sellers have
complete knowledge of the market and no attachment to any suppliers
or customers, (2) the number of sellers is large so that none produces
a significant share of the goods produced, (3) new firms can enter the
tax return, even under accelerated depreciation rates. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 161-
62, 167; TREAs. REG. §§ 1.1221-1 (a), 1.167 (a) 10, 1.167 (c)-1 (1964). However, the
force of this argument is undercut, for goods which qualify, by the effect of the invest-
ment credit provisions added to the 1954 Code by the Revenue Act. of 1964. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46-48.
Assuming 20% of this 154 is deductible in the current year, the firm will have to pay
federal corporate income tax on 37¢ per unit sold because of reciprocity, but will only
obtain 254 net gain from the sale of each such unit, plus additional depreciation benefits
in later years. Therefore, reciprocity will have increased attraction for a firm where
the goods purchased by the firm, the goods which give it the power to demand reci-
procity, can be charged to current operating expense. An excellent example is ship-
ment of goods on a carrier which in return purchases from the shipper.
However, if reciprocity is a long-continued practice, after the first few years the
effect of delay in deducting depreciation will be offset by the continuing availability of
depreciation each year from purchases necessitated by past reciprocity so that the de-
creased returns from reciprocity will end, or at least be greatly diminished, where
capital goods, rather than goods or services deductible as operating expenses, are
purchased.
84 See, e.g., Day, Conglomerate Mergers and "The Curse of Bigness," 42 N.C.L.
Rv. 511, 513-14 (1964).
"I Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241(1940). Many other writings about workable competition are collected in Day, stpra
note 34, at 514 n.9. Professor Stocking has written:
In any event a market arrangement, to be workably competitive in Clark's terms,
must be economically more advantageous to the general public than any practically
attainable alternative.... As others have contributed to it the concept has acquired
greater depth and breadth but no greater precision.... According to the modern-
ized concept an industry is effectively or workably competitive if market forces-
i.e., the total influence of independent decisions by buyers and sellers regardless of
their number-provide the drive for technological innovation, the allocation of
resources, the organization of production, and the distribution of income.. . . Most
would agree that in determining the effectiveness of workability of competition in
any particular industry one should examine its structure, the conduct of firms
within it, and the performance of the firms and of the industry as a whole.
Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and Monwpoly, 64 YALE LJ.
1107, 1109 (1955).
36 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 320, 324-36 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ATr'Y GEN. REP.).
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industry with costs identical to those of established firms, and (4) all
buyers and sellers have complete mobility r.
Workable competition differs from pure competition in several ways:
(1) it requires fewer sellers than the large number required by perfect
competition, but that smaller number must actively compete and must
not bar the entry of others; (2) it does not require that all sellers pro-
duce identical goods and that no buyers have preferences among sell-
ers; (3) it does not require that there be absolute freedom of entry,
but accepts certain barriers such as high initial costs and large capital
requirements; and (4) it recognizes the desirability of quality improve-
ment and of the development of new products and processes, whereas
pure competition seeks cost reduction as its main goal.88
An evaluation of the economic effects of reciprocity in terms of a
desired structure and conduct that is workably competitive must con-
sider the harm reciprocity inflicts upon competition, and the impetus
reciprocity provides toward other, desired economic goals. Reciprocity
does reduce competition, thereby decreasing, at least in the short run,
the drive for efficiency which produces lower costs and prices. Reci-
procity encourages the diversification which enables a firm to use the
power its purchases give it and to make different purchases, thereby
building up new markets for its present products and for use of its
reciprocity power. This impetus to diversification, plus the tendency to
favor large firms, makes reciprocity a serious threat, in some situations,
to workable competition. Reciprocity encourages concentration at the
same time that it tends to drive smaller firms from the market and to
decrease the ease of entry of new competitors.
On the other hand, reciprocity also produces certain desirable results.
By encouraging diversification, it may promote the development of
firms with financial stability derived from their lack of dependence on
only one industry. By giving a firm greater certainty about future
demand for its goods, reciprocity may allow greater accuracy in plan-
ning the most efficient schedules for production and for acquiring new
equipment and financing. Reciprocity also may help establish the
stability, certainty, and profits from efficiency that encourage a firm to
expand its capacity, devote large sums to research, and use its resources
most efficiently. However, the certainty aspects of reciprocity should
not be stressed too heavily since reciprocity, unlike a merger for ex-
ample, is an easily reversible practice. This easy reversibility not only
3 7Id. at 337.8 Id. at 338.
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reduces reciprocity's benefit regarding stability but also lessens the
harm reciprocity does to workable competition.
The fact that both harms and benefits stem from reciprocity, when
it is viewed against the grid of workable competition, makes it impor-
tant to analyze each reciprocity situation carefully to determine the
relative degrees to which these harms and benefits are present. It may
well be impossible to conclude that reciprocity is always harmful to
workable competiton. It clearly is impossible to believe that reciprocity
always helps such competition.
So far, no examination has been made of the economic effects of
"psychological reciprocity." It seems clear that in many situations
there will be no difference in effect between (1) the reciprocity policy
of a large firm and (2) the uncertainty about a large firm's attitudes
that induces suppliers of that firm to adopt the policy of buying from
that firm. However, there may be a difference in degree. When Small
Firm A knows Large Firm B follows a reciprocity policy, A's risks in
deciding to buy elsewhere are greater than when A is unsure whether
or not Large Firm B uses reciprocity. If A switches suppliers, B may
not alter its purchases from A. But if B actively follows a reciprocity
policy, B cannot allow A "to get away with it" in the sense of violating
B's policy with impunity.
Where B's purchasing power is so great that Small Firm A buys from
B and believes such purchases are or may be necessary just to maintain
the status quo regarding the percentage of B's requirements of A's
products which B buys from A, there is "negative psychological reci-
procity," with an effect the same as if B followed a reciprocity policy.
In fact the distortion of a competitive market may be greater, since
there will be many firms in A's position who will give B the benefit
of reciprocity without expecting any increase in B's patronage. In the
straight reciprocity situation, when Little Firm A increases its pur-
chases from B, it may expect a similar increase in B's orders.
III. LEGALITY UNDER EXISTING ANTITRUST STATUTES
Sherman Act, section 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal
to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any
part of interstate or foreign commerce. 9 Monopolization occurs (1) if
a company, through use of restraints of trade violating section 1 of the
Sherman Act, acquires or maintains monopoly power, defined as "the
39 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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power to control prices or exclude competition"; 0 (2) if a company has
such power and has exercised or plans to exercise it, through any exclu-
sionary practice (even if not a violation of section 1) or, perhaps,
through any other means; I or (3) possibly if a company possesses an
overwhelming share of the market and does business, unless the com-
pany bears the burden of proving that its monopoly power was "thrust
upon" it by "honestly industrial" conduct such as its superior skill,
planning or industry.,2 Once the scope of the relevant market has been
proven,"3 and the defendant's predominant share in that market dem-
onstrated," rebuttable presumptions arise "that the defendant has mo-
40 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ;
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 n24 (1948), quoting United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948).
41 United States v. Griffith, supra note 40, at 107; American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 811, 814 (1946). See United States v. United Shoe Machin-
ery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 342 (D.Mass. 1953) (Wyzanski, J.), aff'd. per curuin, 347
U.S. 521 (1954).
42 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964) (Wyzanski,
J.); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra note 41 (dictum). Cf.
United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F2d 416, 429-32 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
On the "thrust upon" defense, see Asf' GEN. REP. at 56-60. Judge Wyzanski, in
United Shoe, supra at 342, expanded upon Judge Hand's "honestly industrial" cat-
egories so as to include
superior skill, superior products, natural advantages (including accessibility to raw
materials or markets), economic or technological efficiency (including scientific re-
search), low margins of profit maintained permanently and without discrimination,
or licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits of law (including patents on
one's own inventions, or franchises granted directly to the enterprise by a public
authority).
43 Before market power can be assessed, the relevant market must be determined.
Substitutes for the product sold must be considered, but an "infinite range" cannot be
given "to the definition of substitutes. Nor is it a proper interpretation of the Sherman
Act to require that products be tangible to be considered in the relevant market."
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956). For a fine
discussion of this case, see Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HAR v.
L. Rv. 281 (1956).
The proper test is "that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for
the same purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of
which may be illegal.' 351 U.S. at 395, citing with approval at 394, Note, The Market:
A Concept in Antitrust, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 580 (1954).
The majority opinion in the DuPont Cellophane case stated that in appraising "rea-
sonable interchangeability" the controlling criterion is "the use or uses to which the
commodity is put." Id. at 396. However, the court in that case employed an analysis
not only of uses (Appendix A, id. at 405-10) but also of the physical properties (Ap-
pendix B, id. at 411) and prices (Appendix C, 'd. at 412) of possible substitutes for
cellophane. Id. at 396-404. At another point, the opinion equates "reasonable inter-
changeability" with the economist's concept of "cross-elasticity of demand."
If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of cus-
tomers of other flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would be an indication
that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them; that the products com-
pete in the same market.
Id. at 400.
44 What degree of control of the relevant market is necessary to monopolize? Judge
Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)
declared that in his opinion 90% control of a market constituted a monopoly, whereas
33% control did not, and he was unsure whether or not 60 or 64% was sufficient.
However, a better approach to monopolization would seem to be that reflected by the
l96S1
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
nopoly power and has monopolized in violation of § 2."'  A finding of
monopolization, unlike an attempt to monopolize or a conspiracy to
monopolize, does not require proof of a specific intent to monopolize."
Upon occasion a dominant firm selling in a market may have suffi-
cient buying power, and may try to use that power-through reciproc-
ity policies-to attempt to monopolize the market in which that firm
sells. A course of dealing between or among two or more firms and
involving reciprocity might, in situations where sufficient market power
is involved, be construed as a combination or conspiracy to monopolize
one or more of the markets involved.
It is even possible that a company's buying power could be so great
that reciprocity demanded by the company enables it to monopolize a
market in which it sells goods. In recent civil and criminal actions, the
Justice Department alleged that General Motors used its power over
shipment of large amounts of freight to induce railroads to purchase
locomotives from subsidiaries acquired by General Motors in 1930, and
that this employment of reciprocity power allowed a monopolization of
the manufacturing of locomotive equipment, violating section 2 of the
Sherman Act."
following language in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948):
We do not undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures by which to measure
the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement of its activities by the purchase of
the assets of a competitor. The relative effect of percentage command of a market
varies with the setting in which that factor is placed.
Various criteria besides market share should be considered: the intent and conduct of
the other firms in the industry, the history of the industry, the nature of the relevant
product and the techniques by which it is produced, and the market shares held by the
other members of the industry. See id. at 527, where similar criteria are suggested in
regard to restraints of trade. As a prerequisite to finding monopolization the proper
test, it is submitted, would employ a sliding scale, requiring an increasing amount of
market power as the method of acquiring that power and the circumstances in which it
was required approach a situation in which the power was thrust upon the holder.
"5 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964) (Wyzanski,J.).
46United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 532 (1948) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
supra note 45, at 248; Rah, Compiracy and the Anti-Trwf Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743,
747-4, and n. 17 (1949); Avzey GEN. REP. 61-62 (1955):
In all cases of attempt, and in those conspiracy cases where monopoly power has not
been achieved, these offenses require proof of something not required where monopo-
lization has succeeded-proof of a specific or subjective intent to accomplish an un-
lawful result.... When a conspiracy or combination is involved, proof of this intent
merges with proof of the conspiracy or combination deliberately entered with a spe-
cific purpose. When the acts are done by a single firm, proof of intent may be
established in the normal way-by contemporaneous documents, industrial back-
ground, and the like-with no single factor controlling.
But in regard to monopolization
the requisite intent ... is not a 'specific' intent to monopolize, but rather a conclusion
based on how the monopoly power was acquired, maintained or used. Id. at 55.
47 United States v. General Motors Corp. (Complaint under section 7 of the Clayton
Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act), Civil Action No. 63-C.-80 (N.D.Ill., Jan. 14,
1963); United States v. General Motors Corp. (Indictment under section 2 of the
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The relevance of section 2 to reciprocity arises mainly from the fact
that reciprocity may be used as a tool by a firm monopolizing or at-
tempting or conspiring to do so. Reciprocity as a result of monopoliza-
tion would seem to be a rare situation. Seldom will a firm monopolize
the market in which it buys-the market from which reciprocity seeks
to transfer power into the market in which the firm sells. Perhaps a
"reverse" type of reciprocity might be employed by a firm using its
monopoly power over the market in which it sells to force its customers
to sell to it. One occasion for such a practice would be a period of war-
time shortages. Where a firm has either (1) the selling power for this
reverse reciprocity or (2) the buying power to monopolize the market
in which it buys, employment of a reciprocity policy is not the only
problem. Such great power, if the firm sells products its suppliers use,
almost inevitably will give rise to negative psychological reciprocity,
unless the powerful firm's officers make it very clear that their com-
pany does not have a reciprocity policy.
There will not be many instances in which a firm has sufficient buying
power to use reciprocity in even an attempt or a conspiracy to monopo-
lize a market in which it sells. Therefore section 2 is of limited applica-
bility in controlling the practice of reciprocity. Moreover, the require-
ment that specific intent be proven further undercuts the utility of the
ban on attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. Proving such an in-
tent will almost always be difficult, unless a written memorandum or
oral testimony by company officers evidencing such intent is available.
In the use-of-reciprocity situation, the proof difficulties are intensified
by the ready availability to a firm of a variety of other seemingly valid
and reasonable policies which explain its purchases from particular
firms.
Where there is the requisite market power to support an allegation
of monopolization, evidence of reciprocity may be used to show that
this power was acquired by methods violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act (one of the tests for monopolization listed above), in cases where
use of reciprocity is held to be a violation of section 1. As will be dis-
cussed below,"5 a rule of reason should be applied in examining reci-
Sherman Act), Crim. Action No. 61-Cr.-356 (S.D.N.Y., April 12, 1961), transferred,
Crim. Action No. 61-Cr.-340 (N.D.IIl., June 7, 1961). See Wall Street Journal, Jan.
15, 1963, p. 2, col. 2; HowARD, LEGAL AsPETS OF MARREING 93-94 (1964). The
criminal indictment was dismissed on December 28, 1964, because ". . . the evidence was
'insufficient to prove the offense alleged." Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29, 1964, p. 5,
col. 2, quoting a statement of Paul A. Owens, Justice Department attorney. However,
the government is continuing with the civil suit against General Motors. Ibid.
'B See page 156 infra.
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procity as a restraint of trade under that section. Monopolization
through use of reciprocity was the gravamen of the complaints in the
General Motors cases.
Reciprocity was evaluated under section 2 of the Sherman Act by the
Federal Trade Commission in the Consolidated Foods case, 0 which
involved a conglomerate merger, discussed below in Part IV. Commis-
sioner Elman, writing for the Commission, stated:
These decisions [in three cases51 he had just discussed, all decided
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act] represent spe-
cific applications of the general principle that abuse of large buying power
to restrict competitive market opportunities is illegal. As the Supreme
Court has held:
"Large scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se. It may yield
price or other lawful advantages to the buyer. It may not, however, be
used to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize interstate trade or
commerce. Nor... [as we hold in United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)] may it be used to stifle competition by de-
nying competitors less favorably situated access to the narket. (United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 [(1948)], italics added.)"
This is precisely the vice of reciprocity as manifested in the cases men-
tioned above. It transforms substantial buying power into a weapon for
'denying competitors less favorably situated access to the market.' It dis-
torts the focus of the trader by interposing between him and the tradi-
tional competitive factors of price, quality, and service an irrelevant and
alien factor which is destructive of fair and free competition on the basis
of merit.5 2
This language, and especially the passage quoted from Griffith,
should not be viewed as establishing that reciprocity "denying competi-
tors less favorably situated access to the market" is either (1) a mo-
nopolization or an attempt to monopolize outlawed by section 2 or (2)
necessarily a violation of section 1.
Let us examine these possible constructions in order. All reciprocity
having the described effect on competitors could not be monopolization
or an attempt to monopolize because, as has already been discussed,
actual or attempted monopoly embodies the concept of control of a
certain portion of a relevant market. Reciprocity by a firm controlling
two per cent of the market in which it sells, and the same percentage
49 Supra note 47.
5 0 Consolidated Foods Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1961-63 F.T.C. Orders), 16182, p.
20972 (Nov. 15, 1962).51 Waugh Equipment Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931); Mechanical Manufacturing Co.,
16 F.T.C. 67 (1932) ; California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1939).52 Consolidated Foods Corp., supra note 50, at p. 20977.
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of the market in which it buys, might well exclude smaller competitors
from selling to the firms from which the reciprocating firm buys. How-
ever, by no stretch of the imagination could this exclusion of competi-
tors from a portion of the market be monopolization, actual or at-
tempted. But the quoted language spoke of barring competitors from
"the market," not from a portion thereof. Again, if the small recipro-
cating firm sells in a market largely controlled by giant firms, the small
firm's adoption of a reciprocating policy may prevent its even smaller
competitors from selling in the market at all. Still, there is no monopo-
lization.
The quoted language could be construed to mean that there would be
monopolization only if reciprocating enables one firm to exclude all
others from a market, but in such a situation there is no need to use the
existence of reciprocity as the basis for a finding of monopolization.
There is a monopoly, and it was not thrust upon the holder of that
position, since that firm did not have to adopt a reciprocity policy. One
exception to this last statement should be noted. It is possible that the
strongest firm in an industry could become a monopoly after adopting
a reciprocity policy as a defense against use of reciprocity by its smaller
competitors. If that were the case, the "thrust upon" defense to mo-
nopolization should be allowed. It is ridiculous to allow a firm to use
reciprocity defensively up to the point where that firm regains its for-
mer market share, but not beyond that point. In the hurly-burly of
competition it might well be difficult for the firm to know how much
reciprocity was necessary to maintain its position. Moreover, it should
be allowed to use reciprocity defensively to regain not only its former
position, but also the position it would have achieved if no other firm in
the industry had begun using reciprocity, and who can say what that
position is? Moreover, even an attempt to limit defensive reciprocity
to mere regaining of the status quo ante bellum probably would require
use of reciprocity in regard to only some of the large firm's customers.
This limited use might be price discrimination made illegal by the
Robinson-Patman Act. 3
Sherman Act, section 1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act" does not
affect the legality of unilateral conduct; its applicability to a reciprocity
53 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). See text accompanying notes
78-109 infra.
5426 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), states, in relevant part:
"Every contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be il-
legal... 2'
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situation requires the presence of an express agreement or of conduct
from which an agreement may be inferred." That Commissioner
55 ATey' GEN. REP. 30; Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelisn and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655-56 (1962);
Rahl, supra note 46, at 744-48.
Traditionally, conspiracy requires the express or tacit agreement of two or more
participants. Rahl, supra note 46, at 752. See generally, Pollack, Common Law
Conspiracy, 35 GEo. LIJ. 328 (1947); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA.
L. R~v. 624 (1941). Cf. Cousens, Agreement As An Element in Conspiracy, 23 VA. L.
REV. 898 (1937) (tracing trend away from agreement requirement).
A fairly recent development, in applying section 1, has been an expansion-some-
what uncertain in extent-of the situations in which an inference of agreement is per-
missible. Reciprocity practiced without an agreement is analogous to "conscious paral-
lelism," in that each firm makes its decisions with consideration for what the other will
do, but there is no actual agreement between the firms.
In oligopoly markets, and even in other markets in reciprocity situations, firms may
act independently, i.e., without any agreement, in such a way that the economic result is
the same as if there were an agreement. "Conscious parallelism" refers to the conduct
of two or more firms, each of which makes the same decision in regard to its conduct
and in doing so takes into account the probable decisions of the other firms and their
reactions to its decision, but none of the firms makes an agreement with any of the
others about what their decisions will be. See, e.g., Turner, supra at 659-60, 663.
There are cases where parallel decisions clearly do, and cases where they dearly do
not, indicate the existence of an agreement. Id. at 659-60. But "the difficult case ... is
that in which the parallel decisions of competitors are interdependent, but the necessary
assurance that parallel action will be taken exists without actual agreement of any
kind." Id. at 660.
No case has been found holding or stating explicitly that conscious parallelism can
constitute a conspiracy, in the absence of a finding of an agreement. However, certain
language of the Supreme Court is far from unambiguous and has given rise to some
academic consideration of the possibility of finding, in some situations, a violation of
section 1, despite the absence of any agreement See, e.g., id. at 673. Cf. KAYSEN &
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 44 (1959).
The Supreme Court stated, in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
142 (1948), "It is enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that that the
defendants conformed to the arrangement," and cited as authority, Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939), and United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265, 275 (1942). Interstate Circuit, supra at 227, declared:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.... Acceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the
necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce,
is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
The words "acceptance without previous agreement" should be construed to mean, not
that no agreement is necessary, but that an agreement can be made without express
statement of its terms and without a meeting of all the parties. While Interstate
Circuit, and also Masonite, supra, might be read as promulgating a new rule that
conspiracy does not require an agreement, that view is incorrect, or at least is not
supported by any Supreme Court holding. In both cases each alleged conspirator was
invited to participate in a program and was informed that the other alleged conspirators
were also invited to participate. 306 U.S. at 215-19, 227; 316 U.S. at 267-74. Thus,
each of these cases involved merely a so-called wheel conspiracy where each conspirator
had contact with the hub, but there was no contact along the rim of the wheel. "The
subjective element of conspiracy was strongly present, and about all the cases really
decided was that the conspirators did not have to attend a meeting." Rahl, supra at 759
n. 59, citing as in accord, Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization--A Reply
to Professor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. REv. 269, 295 (1949).
In Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41(1954), the Court, in discussing the refusal of movie distributors to license first-run
films to a suburban theatre, stated:
The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward petitioner stemmed
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Elman and the Supreme Court he was quoting so recognized becomes
from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express. To be sure, busi-
ness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may
infer agreement... But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behavior conclusively establishes agreement, or, phrased differently, that such be-
havior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of con-
sciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely.
"Conclusively" in this quotation should not be construed as implying anything about
whether or not a fact-finder mnay find that "proof of parallel business behavior" estab-
lishes an agreement. Since the quoted language was written to support affirmance of
the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, id., at 541, all Justice Clark
was saying was that a factfinder is not required to infer an agreement from parallel
business conduct. It is hard to imagine a case where there will be no other relevant
evidence. The best rule would be to allow the jury to consider the parallelism, all other
evidence, and the demeanor of witnesses, including that of the company officials testify-
ing there was no agreement. It does seem fair to state that the present rule is that a
conspiracy, within the meaning of section 1, requires an agreement, but does not require
an express agreement or even a meeting of th alleged conspirators. See Rahl, supra,
at 758-59, written in 1950, before the Theatre Enterprises case. "So long as assent tojoint particpation is manifest it does not matter how it came about.... The conspir-
acy may creep into existence from the merging of unilateral actions upon a common
course if at some stage, not necessarily simultaneously, the defendants take on thefeeling of common cause." Rahl, supra at 759.
A recent decision has reiterated the rule that mere "conscious parallelism" is not a
basis for a finding of violation of section 1. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F2d 1000
(9th Cir. 1965) Jan. 20: "An accidental or incidental price uniformity, or even 'pure'
conscious parallelism of prices is, standing alone, not unlawful." Id., at 1007. Accord:
KAvssx & Tmuanu, supra at 44. While "there must be an element of agreement,"
Esco Corp., .upra at 1007, an exchange of "specific assurances" is not necessary, and
"any conformance to a agreed or contemplated pattern of conduct will warrant an in-
ference of conspiracy.' Id. at 1008. Written and oral assurances are "unnecessary,"
"if a course of conduct, or a price schedule, once suggested or outlined by a competitor
in the presence of other competitors, is followed by all--generally and customarily-
and continuously for all practical purposes, even though there be slight variations." Id.
at 1008. In other words, knowledge of a course of conduct suggested by a competitor
plus parallelism in pursuing that course is evidence from which an agreement may be
implied.
The definition of "combination" as used in section 1 also might be thought to be
subject to some uncertainty. The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), may be read as differentiating between con-
spiracies and combinations. At several points in the majority opinion, the word "com-
bination" is used alone. E.g., 362 U.S. at 43, 44, 45. However, when read in the con-
text of the entire opinion, it is submitted, these uses of the word "combination" are
consistent with the view that the meanings of "combination" and "conspiracy" are inter-
changeable. See 362 U.S. at 30, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45-47. Especially relevant is the language
in which the Court states-its conclusions:
In thus involving the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke, Davis products to the
retailers, thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its suggested retail prices, Parke
Davis created a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain
retail prices and violated the Sherman Act...
Moreover, Parke, Davis also exceeded the 'limited dispensation which [Colgate]
confers,' ... in another way ... [arranging with retailers to resume sales to them
if their advertising of cut-rate prices was stopped].... The manufacturer is thus the
organizer of a price-maintenance combnation or conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act. (Emphasis and second bracket added.)
Id. at 45-47. Of course, arrangements with wholesalers could be a combination, and
those with retailers either a combination or conspiracy. But neither the Court nor
common sense indicates any reason for such a distinction. One other example may well
be conclusive:
When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement of his
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evident when their words56 are read in the context of the fact situations
under consideration. Consolidated Foods dealt with a conglomerate
merger. Griffith and Paramount Pictures clearly involved express
agreements.57
A finding of an agreement to reciprocate need not be based upon a
written contract or an express oral agreement. If each of two firms felt
that an agreement had been made and each felt obligated to make pur-
chases from the other in return for the other's purchases from it, a
sufficient agreement should be held to exist. Of course, what the firms'
officers felt cannot be determined other than by objective evidence of
their conduct and their testimony explaining it. In not every case of
actual agreement will express written contracts or witnesses' testimony
be available. The courts should hold that a jury can infer an agree-
ment from reciprocal conduct accompanied by proof that the goods
purchased were poorer in quality or higher in price than those available
from the seller's competitors, unless there is a showing by the defend-
ants of valid reasons for the purchaser's decision to make a deal which
does not appear to be his best buy. Such a rule would not be as harsh
as it might seem. All it really does is to shift the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence, thereby inducing the defendants' officers to
testify (if such was the situation and, unfortunately, in some cases
where it is not) that there was conscious parallelism and no agreement
in the adoption of reciprocity policies. Then the finder of fact will have
an opportunity to evaluate the officers' veracity. The inducement to
testify will stem from fear that failure to do so will convince the fact
finder that there was an agreement, and from the rule's effect in pre-
venting a directed verdict for the defendants when the prosecution only
proves reciprocal buying and selling including purchases not the best
buys available.
policy and the simple refusal to deal... he has put together a combination in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. Thus, whether an unlawful comniution or conspiracy is
proved is to be judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words
they used. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 44. Moreover, pre-Parke, Davis authority exists in support of the view that the
terms are interchangeable. Rahl, supra at 744, n.5, citing BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY(and his references appear unchanged in the Fourth Edition, dated 1951) and the prac-
tice of antitrust pleaders. This latter citation is consistent with Parke, Davis, where
the complaint alleged that the defendant "conspired and combined." 362 U.S. at 30.
A finding of illegality under section 1 does not require proof of a specific intent to
restrain trade. It is enough that the participating firms intended to form a "contract,"
"combination," or "conspiracy" which did in fact unreasonably restrain interstate or
foreign trade. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
56 See text accompanying notes 51, 52, supra.
57 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1948); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1948).
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Where the goods purchased were equal in price and quality to those
available from the seller's competitors, allowing such an inference of
agreement does not seem reasonable, in the absence of extrinsic evi-
dence. A firm is free to buy where it pleases. Accounting and clerical
simplicity dictate keeping the number of its suppliers as low as possible.
The inability to infer an agreement in such factual settings may seem
a serious barrier to using the Sherman Act to reduce the practice of
reciprocity. This deficiency is more evident than troublesome. A com-
petitor annoyed by reciprocity can cut his price, transforming the situa-
tion into the one just previously discussed, where a party suspected of
acting under a reciprocity agreement fails to take his best buy. Also,
when reciprocity is conducted pursuant to a long-term agreement, there
are likely to be situations when the reciprocating seller will not be
offering prices and qualities equal to the best available from his com-
petitors.
Where no agreement is found, the Sherman Act conspiracy provisions
are not applicable. Where an agreement to monopolize is found, there
are violations of both section 1 and section 2. Where an actual agree-
ment to reciprocate is found, the question of a section 1 violation turns
upon whether or not the agreement and conduct pursuant to it unrea-
sonably restrain interstate or foreign trade. Any reciprocity agree-
ment restrains trade to some extent. Competitors of each party to the
agreement are hindered in selling to the other party. Under the Rule
of Reason adopted by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil8 and
American Tobacco" cases, only unreasonable restraints of trade violate
section 1, and the inherent nature, purpose, and effect of the restraint
should be considered in determining reasonableness."0
Certain types of restraints have been found to have such harmful
effects without any countervailing benefits that they are generally held
to be unreasonable per se. Price fixing,6 division of markets,62 group
boycotts,63 and tying arrangements64
5 8 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1911).
59 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 178-81 (1911).ID Id. at 179.
D' United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).62 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
0 3 Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941).64 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The analogy be-
tween tying agreements and reciprocity arrangements was used by Commissioner
Elman, in Consolidated Foods Corp., supra note 50, at p. 20,977, and has been noted by
other writers: Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HAav. L.
REv. 873, 883-84 (1964); Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: A
Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 73 (1964); HALE & HALE, MARKET PowER: SmzE
AND SHAPE UNDER THE SERA ACT, § 2.17, at 47 n. 9 (1958).
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are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use. The principle of per se unreasonableness not
only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman
Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic inves-
tigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when under-
taken.
Should reciprocity agreements be conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable; i.e., should they be illegal per se? An answer to this ques-
tion requires an analysis of the harmful effects and countervailing bene-
fits to competition and business justifications of reciprocity. Such an
analysis can be guided by comparing the effects and benefits of reci-
procity with those of the restraints which have previously been held
illegal per se.
Reciprocity involves a firm's use of power in a market in which it
buys to increase its power in a market in which it sells. Tying contracts
involve the transfer of power from one selling market to another. Tie-
in sales may require a purchaser to take goods it does not want. Reci-
procity only requires, at worst, the taking of inferior goods at higher
prices, but goods of a type the purchaser needs. And, in many reciproc-
ity situations, the goods may be equal in price and quality to the best
buy available to the purchaser from the seller's competitors. Reciproc-
ity is only a hurdle for competitors to get over; a group boycott is an
absolute bar to doing business with the boycotting firms and may even
be a bar to the excluded firm's remaining in business. Price-fixing and
division of markets are much more extensive restraints on competition
than is reciprocity. When a firm sets its price or agrees not to sell in
certain areas, generally the benefits it derives from the agreement might
be expected to induce it to observe the agreement. But a reciprocity
agreement can be made unattractive by price reductions or quality
increases by competitors. It is truly a hurdle, not a grave barrier, in
many cases. Moreover, even if reciprocity were viewed as fit to be
linked with the restraints held illegal per se, it should be remembered
that an exception has been made in the per se rule in regard to tie-in
agreements," and there is always the possibility that the Supreme
65 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).66 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.Supp. 545 (E.D.Pa. 1960); aff'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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Court will apply the same approach in regard to price-fixing, group
boycotts, and division of territories. Also, as previously discussed,
')
there are various benefits flowing from reciprocity. Therefore, red-
procity agreements should be dealt with under a rule of reason ap-
proach, at least until as much is known about their merits and demerits
as was known about other restraints before they were declared to be
per se violations.
If the conclusions developed in this article are accepted by the
courts, the Sherman Act can be a potent weapon in reducing the use of
reciprocity in cases where there is (1) an agreement to reciprocate or
monopolize, (2) an attempt to monopolize, or (3) actual monopoliza-
tion. A company's unilateral adoption of reciprocity policies cannot be
dealt with under the Sherman Act unless there is an attempt to monop-
olize or actual monopolization.
Federal Trade Commission Act, section 5. Section 5(a) (1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act68 states: "Unfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are hereby declared unlawful." The italicized portion was
added by the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938.69 Before this amendment, the
Federal Trade Commission, in three cases,"' held that use of buying
power to force others to purchase from those possessing that power or
to force them to harm the possessors' competitors violated this section.
While none of these opinions went into any involved economic analysis,
they did make it clear that the real evil was the compelling of others to
make sales, route goods, or charge prices in a manner not determined
by competition in the traditional aspects of price, quality, and serv-
ice. 1 Two cases, Waugh Equipment Co."' and Mechanical Manufac-
turing Co.,"8 concerned firms owned by officers of large meatpackers.
The officers used their power to control shipments of meat products to
force railroads to purchase certain equipment from the firms named.
The third case, Cailfornia Packing Corp.,' involved the use of power
derived from extensive purchases, shipments and sales to (1) compel
shippers to use a freight terminal owned by respondents, (2) pressure
the customers and suppliers of competitors of California Packing so
6 7 See Parts I and II .supra.
6838 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958).
69 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111.7oCalifornia Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Waugh Equipment Co., 15
F.T.C. 232 (1931) ; Mechanical Manufacturing Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).
7115 F.T.C. at 246-47; 16 F.T.C 74-75; 25 F.T.C. at 398-99.
72 15 F.T.C. 232,246-47 (1931).
78 16 F.T.C. 67, 74-75 (1932).
7-'25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
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that shipments to and from such competitors had to be routed through
respondents' terminal, and (3) pressure suppliers to charge California
Packing's competitors higher prices than California Packing was re-
quired to pay. The Commission noted that use of reciprocity, in the
manner described in these cases, hurt competitors and the public."
Reciprocity was referred to as "a competitive weapon, oppressive and
coercive in nature.
7 6
In almost all circumstances, reciprocity policies pursued by a firm
will affect its competitors. Therefore, the amendment added in 1938 to
cover unfair acts or practices not affecting competition generally will
not add to the result reached in the three cases just discussed. But
where reciprocity is used by a firm which has a monopoly of one of the
goods it sells, with reciprocity employed, for example, to demand a
higher price for the goods, the clause added in 1938 would seem to
apply and to furnish a means of finding illegality.
It is notable that section 5(a) (1), unlike section 1 of the Sherman
Act, applies without proof of any reciprocity agreement. While the
Federal Trade Commission has not brought recent cases under this
section, there seems to be no reason why it cannot do so and apply a
rule of reason test to determine when reciprocity is an unfair method
of competition or an unfair practice. A recent Comment in the Harvard
Law Review, discussing these Federal Trade Commission cases, con-
cluded:
These cases establish that coercive reciprocal dealing is a violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. But in reciprocity,
coercion is not the gravamen of the injury to competition. A supplier
who has no occasion to purchase the practitioner's products may be
simply cut off or ignored; threats are irrelevant. Yet, the injury to com-
petition is no less for the absence of bullying. It is doubtful that section 5
can reach unilateral practices in which no threat or suggestion is commu-
nicated and, often, none is intended.77
In the first place, reciprocity used in a situation where there is no
threat, even implied, probably is a rarer occurrence than this quotation
indicates. Moreover, section 5 speaks of unfair methods of competition
and unfair practices, not threats. If the economic results do not depend
upon any communication between the buyer using reciprocity and the
seller unable to reciprocate, there would seem to be no barrier to a
,5 15 F.T.C. at 246-47; 16 F.T.C. at 74-75; 25 F.T.C. at 398-99.T6 Mechanical Manufacturing Co., 16 F.T.C. 67, 74 (1932).
77 Hausman, supra note 64, at 885.
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holding that buying in accordance with a reciprocity policy, when there
is an unreasonable restraint of trade caused thereby, is an unfair act or
practice. The meaning of section 5 in regard to reciprocity is not lir-
ted to the holdings of three, pre-1938 cases.
Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2 of the Clayton Act,"8 as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act of 193 6,1 states in part:
(a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimina-
tion are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them....
(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimi-
nation in price which is prohibited by this section.
Price discrimination condemned under section 2 (a) is not a violation of
the act if it falls within one of the justifications contained in sections
2 (a) and 2 (b). Insofar as they apply to reciprocity situations, these
justifications are limited to two: (1) the difference in price makes
"only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered," or (2) the
lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor. In regard to both of these justifications, which appear in
2 (a) and 2 (b) respectively, the burden of proof rests upon the defend-
ant.80
No previous mention of the Robinson-Patman Act as a means of
combating reciprocity has been found in the legal literature.8' Never-
7838 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
79Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526.80 F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948) ; United States v. Borden
Co., 370 U.S. 460, 467 (1962); Robinson-Pat an Act, § 2 (b).81 The applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act when "two firms in bilateral buyer-
seller relationships grant one another preferential prices," has been noted. Phillips,
Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: Observations on the Hales' Comment, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 77, 78 (1964). As the author states, "This is simply price discrimination
with customer classification based on reciprocity." Ibid. However, no authority has
been found which discusses the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to reciprocity
situations generally.
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theless, there would seem to be a sound argument that section 2 is vio-
lated by a sale made with knowledge that the seller will thereby be
induced to buy from the buyer. The cash paid by the buyer purchases
a preferred position in subsequently selling to the seller in addition to
the goods. Because all of the cash paid is not payment for the goods,
a sale for which a reciprocal purchase is expected is made at a lower
price per unit of goods than is a sale of the same goods to a buyer with
whom the seller does not have a reciprocal relationship, made at the
same apparent price. This analysis would seem to be in accord with the
expectations of at least some businessmen. One purchasing agent has
recommended: "Reciprocity is a means of paying cash for good will."' 2
It may be argued that there can be no discrimination where Seller X
is willing to buy from both Buyers A and B if X can use their goods,
but X cannot use B's goods. However, courts and legal scholars agree
that equality in regard to other portions of the Robinson-Patman Act
requires like treatment to be available, both practically and theoreti-
cally.8 In the reciprocity situation just stated, like treatment, while
theoretically available, is not practically available to B. Once there is
a finding of price discrimination in a reciprocity situation, 2 (a) may
well be violated unless a justification applies. There can be no question
that competition at the level of the person granting the discrimination
is injured, as is competition (for sales) with a customer of the grantor
of the discrimination. The argument that reciprocity should be con-
strued as price discrimination finds further support in sections 2(d)84
and 2(e),15 banning discriminatory granting of, and payments for,
services and facilities by sellers of goods. These sections, read with
2 (a), indicate that Congress intended to bar invidious discrimination
in connection with sales to the full extent of its powers. 6
Under section 2(f), the buyer who knows that the seller intends to
reciprocate violates the Act if the seller violates the Act. However, the
usefulness of section 2 (f) has been largely vitiated by the requirement
82 Sloane, Reciprocity: Where Does the PA. Standf, PURCHASiNG, No. 20, 1961,
p. 70, at 77.
83 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 837-38
(7th Cir. 1958) ; Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F2d 988, 994 (8th
Cir. 1945) ; Michael, Advertising and Promotional Allowances and Services Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 11 LOYOLA L. Rnv. 9, 24-25 (1962). The terms "theoretically
available" and "practically available" were used by Ira M. Milstein, Esq., in a lecture
delivered on May 5, 1964, to the Unfair Trade Practices II class at New York Univer-
sity School of Law.
8449 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. : 13(d) (1958).
8549 Stat. 1526 1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958).86 See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-8 (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-17 (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-8 (1936).
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that the Government carry the burden of proof regarding the buyer's
knowledge of illegal price discrimination practiced by his seller8 7
A successful cost justification defense may meet some 2 (a) attacks
on reciprocity, where a long-continued relationship between the recipro-
cating firms reduces the costs each incurs in selling and where reciproc-
ity, by helping to stabilize the sales volume of each firm, aids in plan-
ning the most efficient production schedules. But in 2 (a) cases, the
respondent seller must carry the extremely difficult burden of proving
that a cost justification underlies diverse prices.88
The meeting competition defense may also meet a 2(a) attack where
the reciprocating seller's competitor or competitors practice reciprocity.
This defense will probably not be allowed where a number of firms in
the seller's industry, including the seller, follow a preconceived policy
of reciprocity. But, where a seller reciprocates to meet a competitor's
price and not because of a preconceived policy, the defense should
apply even if the competitor's use of reciprocity is illegal.
Where the worrisome competitive injury is at the seller's level, there
is no general requirement that the price met be legal; but the defend-
ing seller must grant a lower price as a genuine response to a compet-
itor's price, not pursuant to a previously adopted pricing system in the
industry 9 Where competitive injury at the buyer's level is alleged,
the defending seller may meet a competitor's price only if he does not,
and should not, know it is illegal.? A widely adopted reciprocity sys-
tem, like a widely practiced pricing system, should be held inherently
illega 1
In reciprocity situations, the relevant competitive injury would seem
to be at the seller's level and in the market in which the buyer sells
to the seller. Since reciprocity does not involve the buyer's paying
lower cash prices, it would not seem to give buyers any real advan-
tage over their competitors in reselling the purchased goods or selling
87 Automatic Canteen Co. v. F.T.C, 346 U.S. 61 (1953) ; Alhambra Motor Parts v.
F.T.C., 309 F.2d 213(9th Cir. 1962) ; D & N Auto Parts Co., 55 F.T.C. 1279 (1959).
See Rowa, PRICE DISCRIMINATO1N UNDER THE RoBrNso-PATmAN ACT 274, 439-51(1962) (hereinafter cited as RowE) ; Rowz (Supp. 1964) 57, 104-11.
88 F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948) ; United States v. Borden
Co., 370 U.S. 460, 467 (1962). See RowE 274 (Supp. 1964) 57. Attempts to employ
the cost justification defense in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission sel-
dom have been successful. See Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission's Adminis ratior
of the Anti-Price Discrimination Law, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 415, 424 and n. 49 (1964),
citing RowE 296-97 nn.113-15 (Supp. 1964) at 63.
89 Rowe 220-23.
90 Id. at 223-26. The only relevant legality is that under the Robinson-Patman Act.
Id. at 229. Moreover, the Government or the plaintiff in a private suit has the burden
of proving the illegality of the price met. Id. at 227.
a' See id. at 226.
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items made from those goods. The net price to the buyer of the
reciprocal purchase may be less than the cash price (hence less than the
net price paid by his non-reciprocating competitors), since the buyer
gets goods plus a preferred position in selling to the reciprocating seller,
with attendant savings derived from efficency and lower selling costs.
The savings which the buyer derives from efficiency and lower selling
costs probably do not, as a general rule, lower the cost at which the
goods are recorded in the buyer's books; but it is the cost at which the
goods are recorded which is likely to determine the prices at which the
goods, or items made from those goods, will be sold by the buyer.
The meeting competition defense must be confined to the area" and
duration" of the reciprocity being met. It is not necessary that the
defending seller's customer actually have received an offer of reciproc-
ity from the seller's competitor; it is sufficient that reciprocity was
actually available to the seller's customer from the seller's competitor.9 '
Moreover, a competitor's price may be met not only in regard to the
defending seller's present customers, but also in competing for new
customers.95
If the cost and meeting competition justifications do not apply and
the commerce requirements are met, a finding of price discrimination
in a reciprocity situation leads to a finding of illegality, if the discrimi-
nation creates a reasonable probability96 that there will be a substantial
lessening of competition or a tendency to create a monopoly. While
there may be situations in which reciprocal practices tend to create
monopoly, generally the illegality of reciprocity under 2 (a) must rest
upon the requisite probability of competitive injury. Such a finding
must be based not on injury to any one competitor, but on injury to
competition generally in the relevant market. "[C] riteria of competi-
tive effect which focus exclusively on individual competitors' sales or
profits rather than the health of the competitive process literally go
beyond the terms of the law."9
Substantial injury to competition from a price discrimination may
occur at either the seller's or the buyer's level. Where a reasonable
probability of substantial lessening of competition at the seller's level
92 Id. at 239.
93 Id. at 238.94 Id. at 235-36.
95 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. F.T.C., 306 F.2d 48, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Rowe 240-
47; RoWE (Supp. 1964) 51-53.96 The words "may be to substantially lessen competition" have been construed to
require proof that a "reasonable possibility" of such a lessening exists. F.T.C. v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).97 AT'y GEN. REP. 165.
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is alleged, the Government or the plaintiff in a civil action has the bur-
den of proving the existence of such a probability of such "primary
line" injury. 8 The relevant sellers are those who market the same prod-
uct as the allegedly discriminating seller.9" Where the allegation is of
competitive injury at the "secondary" or buyer's level, the injury will
generally be presumed once a substantial price differential is proven,' 0
at least where the differential was of long duration.' However, other
factors may undercut such a presumption.102 Establishing the reason-
able probability of competitive impact will be easier in cases of long-
term, continuous reciprocal buying than in cases of purchases which
are unrelated to a course of dealing.
Reciprocity may violate section 2 (d)10 1 of the Robinson-Patman
Act, which bars payments by a seller in consideration of services fur-
nished by a customer in connection with goods sold or offered for sale
by the seller, unless the seller makes such payments "available on pro-
portionately equal terms to all other customers competing in the distri-
bution of" those goods. When a seller makes a reciprocal purchase
from a buyer, the advantage granted to the original buyer could be
viewed as a payment to it in consideration of service in buying from
the seller. The service afforded to the seller by reciprocity is a real and
valuable one, including not only the preferential purchase, but also the
certainty of volume of business provided.
Section 2 (d) also covers three-cornered and other multi-party reci-
procity arrangements, since it forbids the discriminatory "payment of
IlSee RowE 141-68; Note, Competitive Injury Under the RoNmon-Patman Act, 74
HARv. L. Rnv. 1597, 1607-10 (1961).
However, "a seller's predatory purpose to injure a competitor's business goes far to
establish the proscribed inimical effects, for an illicit intent accentuates the probability
that a prohibited consequence will come to pass." Rowe 144, citing, inter alia, F.T.C.
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 (1960). See RowE 144-50. Note, sugpra
note 98, at 1602-03.
19 9 McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., 76 F.Supp. 456, 460-61 (W.D.
Mo. 1948) (complaint dismissed on other grounds); Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Re-
fining Co., 41 F.Supp. 436, 438 (N.D.Ill. 1941). See RowE 142-43.
100 F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948):
We think that the language of the Act, and the legislative history .. . show that
Congress meant ... that in a case involving competitive injury between a seller's
customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser
a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser's
competitors.
See Note, supra note 98, at 1612-14.
101 See American Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 325 F2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963).
102 See ibid (distinguishing Morton Salt). In American Oil, it could not be reason-
ably inferred that the respondent gasoline company's temporarily lower prices to sta-
tions in area of price %var was cause of loss of sales by American stations in nearby
area which did not get lower prices, since other gasoline companies and stations in price
war area had begun war.
10. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (d) (1963).
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anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer" of the payor in
return for services furnished by the customer. However, 2 (d) by its
very terms does not apply when the reciprocity is proportional; i.e.,
when a firm places its orders in proportion to the volume of other firms'
purchases from it. Admittedly, Congress did not have reciprocity in
mind when it enacted section 2 (d),1°1 but the underlying policy behind
the Act, and behind 2 (d) in particular, that of equality of treatment,
would seem to support the application of 2 (d) to reciprocity situa-
tions."'
Moreover, the first part of the criminal liability provisions contained
in section 3106 of the Act seem to apply to reciprocity situations.
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or
contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors
of the purchaser, in that, any discount, rebate, [or] allowance... is
granted to the purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, [or]
allowance... available at the time of such transaction to said competitors
in respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity; ...
An argument similar to that made in regard to section 2 (a) would seem
to apply here: when the seller grants to the buyer a preferred position
in selling to the seller, the seller is giving the buyer something other
than the goods the buyer bought in return for the money the buyer
paid. That extra something would seem to fall within the categories
Congress described when it used the words "discount," "rebate," and
"allowance."'01 The relevant portion of section 3 appears to be ap-
plicable only to sellers. °8 Unlike section 2 (a), section 3 is not appli-
cable where discrimination is coupled with differences in quantities of
goods sold."0 9
Where the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable, there is no need to
establish any agreement. The charging of the usual price, to a buyer
who also gets a preferred position in future purchases by the seller, is
sufficient conduct, if the requisites previously discussed are established.
10' See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7 (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7, 15-16 (1936) ; H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess 7
(1936).
'o5 Ibid. See note 104 supra.
1049 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1963).
107 See the comments of Senator Borah, on the Borah-Van Nuys bill (S. 4171, in-
troduced Mar. 4, 1936. 80 Cong. Rec. 3204 (1936)), which became section 3: 80 Cong.
Rec. 6333 (1936) ("if an advantage or a favor or a commission is granted to A, the
seller must be prepared to grant it to B."), quoted in Rowe 456.
108 See Rows 459-61 (Supp. 1964) 112.
109 Id. at 463.
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The Effect of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Despite at least one
commentator's views to the contrary, 1 a finding of illegality in regard
to reciprocity may not be based upon direct application of section 3 of
the Clayton Act,"" barring a seller from making a sale, contract of sale,
price, or rebate contingent upon the purchaser's agreeing not to
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the... seller, where
the effect of such.., sale ... or such condition, agreement or understand-
ing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce.
Whether reciprocity is viewed as a sale conditioned on a return sale or
a purchase conditioned on a return purchase, the conduct fails to fall
within the terms of the statute. When A sells to B and B agrees to sell
to A, B is not agreeing not to "use or deal in" the goods of A's com-
petitor. B may be agreeing not to sell to A's competitor, but the only
thing B foregoes using or dealing in, that could come from the com-
petitor, is the money he would pay for B's goods. Similarly, when A
buys from B and B agrees to buy from A, B (the seller in the first
transaction) makes his sale conditional upon B's own agreement to
purchase from A, not upon A's agreeing to anything. Section 3 is clear
that it must be the purchaser who agrees not to deal in or use the goods
of the seller's competitor.
It may be worthwhile to inquire if the policy behind section 3 might
evidence congressional intent to invalidate reciprocity, which could
L0 Note, Reciprocity-Antitrust Violation By Natural Reaction, 32 GEo. WAsn. L.
REv. 832, 853 (1964):
By this reasoning, reciprocity essentially enables "one seller to succeed over another,
not on the basis of a better product or a lower price but because of his power or
leverage in another market." Thus in the future reciprocity might be attacked under
section three of the Clayton Act, a sale being made conditional on a return sale.
Actually, reciprocity generally seems to involve a purchase being made conditional
on a return purchase. Cf. Phillips, Reciprocity Under The.Antitrust Laws: Observa-
tions on the Hale.? Conment, 113 U. PA. L. Ray. 77, 78-79 (1964):
As the Hales point out, reciprocity could operate as a 'tying' device; with bne or both
of the firms offering a product which in some form combined that of the other as a
necessary condition of sale. Reciprocity might also result in bilateral exclusive
dealerships. In both cases § 3 of the Clayton Act provides a remedy, again subject
to the substantial-effect-on-competition test, and so here too, the fact of reciprocity
does not alone violate the law."
Obviously there is a difference between reciprocity implemented through a tying
agreement or exclusive dealership contract with a third party, with that- agreement or
contract being held illegal under § 3, and a view regarding § 3 as a weapon against
reciprocity itself. The Hale's Comment is Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under The
Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1964).
11138 Stat. 731 (1944), is 15 U.S.C. 14 (1958). See Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing
and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HaRv. L. Rnv. 873, 884 (1964).
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have the effect proscribed in the section 3 language quoted above." 2
The affirmative answer would be supported by the following argument:
the Clayton Act clarifies the application of the Sherman Act to certain
specified situations; the objective Congress pursued and the results it
sought to prevent under any particular section of the Clayton Act re-
flect consciously adopted policy; other sections of the Clayton Act,
and the Serman Act and other antitrust statutes, should be con-
strued in a manner consistent with the indicated congressional pur-
poses; "the prohibitions of section 3 are aimed at so-called 'exclusive
dealing arrangements' and 'tying contracts' ";... their vice is that they
implement the extension of power to outbid competitors in Transaction
No. 1 into such power in Transaction No. 2; reciprocity contains the
same vice; therefore, other sections of the Clayton Act, the Sherman
Act and other antitrust statutes should be construed in accordance with
a congressional policy against reciprocity whose effect "may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce."
The contrary argument is bifurcated. The first contention will be
that each section of the Clayton Act should be read, not as evidencing
more broadly applicable underlying policies, but as dealing with only
the factual situations described therein; Congress intended the Clayton
Act to be a clarifier; if section 3 had been intended to affect the legality
of reciprocity, its language would have so indicated explicitly. The
second contention is that if section 3 can be viewed as relevant to the
legality of reciprocity, it supports the validity of that practice: if Con-
gress wished to make reciprocity an antitrust violation, section 3 was
the logical place to do so; since such a result was not embodied therein,
a negative implication arises.
It is impossible to make a conclusive choice between these two ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation. However, it is submitted that the
first view has more merit. It is unlikely that Congress had reciprocity
in mind at all when section 3 was enacted, and it seems false to impute
a legislative negative intent from the failure to extend that section to
practices other than tying and exclusive dealing agreements. There-
fore, the policy underlying section 3 would seem to support the views
112 In regard to the requisite effect, compare Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States 337 U.S. 293 (1949), with Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320 (1961). See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 202-09
(1961).
113 Rose, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
8 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 639 (1940).
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advocated elsewhere in this article concerning the application of other
parts of the Clayton Act and of other antitrust statutes to reciprocity.
IV. CONGLOMERATE MFRGERS AND RECIPROCITY
Section 7 of the Clayton Act bars mergers, 14 whether accomplished
by acquisition of stock or by acquisition of assets, where either both
corporations or just the acquired corporation is engaged in commerce
and "where in any line of commerce, in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly."" In United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co."6 the Supreme Court held that to prove a violation of
section 7 there must be a showing that (1) "the market affected" is
"substantial," and (2) there is "a likelihood that competition may be
'foreclosed in a substantial share of... [that market].' "I"
1 4 The word "merger" does not appear in section 7, but the applicability of that sec-
tion to mergers was enunciated and explained in United States v. Philadelphia Natl.
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 341-49 (1963).
Conglomerate mergers increasing reciprocity power or negative psychological
reciprocity power could be violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, if they are thought to
be unreasonable restraints of trade. However, since it is the practice of reciprocity,
not the potential therefor, which would do the restraining, a likelihood of substantial
negative psychological reciprocity would seem to be required for the merger itself to
be viewed as a restraint of trade. In any event, the more explicit tests of § 7 of the
Clayton Act seem more useful and obviate the need to turn to § 1. Even if the recent
decision in United States v. First Nat'l. Bank, 376 U.S. 665 (1964) portends a willing-
ness by the Court to apply as stringent tests under § 1 as under § 7 to all mergers, see
The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 268-69 (1964), it certainly does
not indicate that any stricter tests will be applicable under § 1. Moreover, a better
reading of that case would stress its emphasis on "the elimination of inter se competi-
tion between" the parties to this horizontal merger, 376 U.S. at 670. Also, the exact
effect of this decision upon existing law is clouded by the fact that the Court, although
emphasizing that the criterion was "the elimination of significant competition" be-
tween the merging companies and that this test was satisfied where those firms oc-
cupied a large share of the relevant market, id. at 669, did list (in quotation) the
relevant criteria laid down in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-
28 (1948), for § 1 mergers. 376 U.S. at 672. The Court then stated: "In the present
case all those factors clearly point the other way, as we have seen.". Ibid. See
Marquis, Compatibility of Industrial Joint Research entures and Antitrust Policy,
38 TmrrLn L.Q. 1, 21 (1964). Cf. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, supra, at 267-68.
" 38 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
"1 353 U.S. 586, 595 (1957), quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 314 (1949). See Commissioner Elman's concurring opinion in Union Carbide
Corp., TRAD- REG. RgE., (1961-63 FTC Orders), i 15503, p. 20375 at 20377.
117 In determining whether some general guidelines are available for deciding what
is "substantial reduction in competition in a substantial market," the answer would
seem to be that no exact standards can be enunciated. Moreover, this situation seems
to result from a conscious policy decision that congressional aims in enacting § 7 are
best effiectuated by leaving the courts with a vague test allowing a balancing of
benefit and harm resulting from each merger.
As stated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962):
It is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was
the rising tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arrest-
ing mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of com-
merce was still in its incipiency.... Congress rejected, as inappropriate to the prob-
lem it sought to remedy, the application to § 7 cases of the standards for judging the
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A conglomerate merger may be defined as one which is neither
horizontal nor vertical; i.e., a merger between two companies which do
legality of business combinations adopted by the courts in dealing with cases arising
under the Sherman Act....
Id. at 317-18.
Congress neither adopted nor rejected specifically any particular tests for measuring
the relevant markets, either as defined in terms of product or in terms of geographic
locus of competition, within which the anticompetitive effects of a merger were to
be judged. Nor did it adopt a definition of the word 'substantially,' whether in
quantitative terms of sales or assets or market shares or in designated qualitative
terms, by which a merger's effects on competition were to be measured... While
providing no definite quantitative or qualitative tests by which enforcement agencies
could gauge the effects of a given merger to determine whether it may 'substantially'
lessen competition or tend toward monopoly, Congress indicated plainly that a
merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its particular industry.
Id. at 320-22.
A court in passing upon a merger, or an attorney in advising about its legality,
must analyze the economic context and effects of the merger to ascertain the relevant
markets, their size and nature, and the extent to which sales or purchases in those
markets will be affected by the merger. Other relevant factors are the fragmented or
concentrated nature of each relevant industry, the presence or absence of recent tend-
encies toward domination by a few firms therein, ease or difficulty of entry, the ease of
access suppliers have to markets, and the ease of access buyers have to suppliers. Id. at
322. Obviously such a listing of factors does not create certainty in their application
to any particular merger. It would seem that no more definite criteria exist.
The Supreme Court has stressed, id. at 329, the virtually identical language used in
§ 7 and in § 3 of the Clayton Act, which invalidates an exclusive dealing or tying agree-
ment the effect of which "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." Id. at 329. Therefore, two pre-Brownt Shoe cases
decided under § 3 are highly relevant to the present discussion. In the Standard Sta-
tions case, Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), the
Court held that a foreclosure of competition in regard to 6.7% of the annual western
United States gasoline sales was sufficiently substantial for illegality. This opinion
might well have given rise to hopes that subsequent decisions would fix a percentage
which would not be a violation, thereby leaving in doubt only the intermediate range
between 6.7 and that figure. However, in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320 (1961), the Court indicated that an effect upon even less than 1% of the
relevant market could be a violation. This opinion clearly paved the way for the wide-
open, indefinite standards already quoted from Brown Shoe. See The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 202-09 (1961), for a comparative analysis of Standard
Stations and Tampa Electric.
Perhaps subsequent cases under § 3 or § 7 will provide more definite tests. Certainly
Tampa Electric can be distinguished on the grounds that it involved (1) the special
situation of the chronically depressed coal industry and (2) public utilities. See 365
U.S. at 322, 334. Also, the percentage of the relevant market affected in Brown Shoe
was not inconsequential. See 370 U.S. at 327, 331, 342-44, 347-54 (appendices).
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), may be viewed as
indicative of a return to a simple test "Having determined that § 7 applied, the Court
treated the proposed merger as 'inherently suspect' because of its size and thus effec-
tively displaced the thorough market analysis recently advocated in Brown Shoe in
favor of the uncomplicated reasoning of Standard Stations." The Supreme Court, 1962
Term, 77 Hxv. L. REv. 62, 162 (1963) (noting that Standard Stations held that sub-
stantial lessening of competition" resulted "simply because a substantial amount of com-
merce was affected." Id. at 162 n.27.) However, in Philadelphia Bank, the Court
stated that they were applying the test laid down in Brown Shoe. 374 U.S. at 355. For
an analysis of Brown Shoe's test, see The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 54, 183-87 (1962). Other language in Philadelphia Bank also supports a broader
view of the proper test:
A merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the rel-
evant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in
that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must
be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely
to have such anti-competitive effects.
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not and potentially could not 8 manufacture the same products or pro-
vide the same services, and where one company does not produce goods
or services used in the production and distribution of the other com-
pany's output. "Such a merger, therefore, does not have the effect of
automatically foreclosing to competitors any market outlet or source of
supply as in a vertical merger, nor does it have the effect of automati-
cally eliminating a competitor as in a horizontal merger." '
Section 7 does not enumerate the types of mergers to which it applies.
However, the House Report on that section stated that
the bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and con-
glomerate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of sub-
stantially lessening competition... or tending to create a monopoly. 20
"No corresponding reference appears elsewhere in the legislative his-
tory,12" ' and section 7's applicability to conglomerate mergers has been
questioned 122
The opinions in Consolidated Foods2' and other recent Federal
374 U.S. at 363. And the Court confined use of this test "to mergers whose size makes
them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue concentra-
tion." Ibid. The Court then notes that the firm resulting from the merger will control
"at least 30%" of the relevant market and that this is enough "to threaten undue con-
centration." Id. at 364. But the Court expressly disavows setting any minimum percent-
age for such a threat to exist. Ibid.
If Brow Shoe does represent a more extensive market analysis, apparently Phil-
adelphzia Bank's test will apply in some cases, with other, less obviously violative situa-
tions being subject to that more extensive analysis. It is fair to conclude that the sub-
stantiality criterion under § 7 awaits a needed, further clarification.
118 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Also see Hale & Hale, Potential
Compelition Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 S.CT. Rxv.
171 (1964). The House report on § 7 defines conglomerate mergers as "those in which
there is no discernible relationship in the nature of business between the acquiring and
acquired firms." H. R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
A truly conglomerate merger is by definition one in which the firms share no com-
mon supply or demand curves. ... [M]ost mergers classified as conglomerate involve
the union of two companies whose products are physically different or which per-
form different functions, yet which are related in some manner due to common
demand or supply elements (the use of idle capacity, better utilization of salesmen,
the investment of surplus capital funds). There is little consensus among the enforce-
ment agencies and the courts about the appropriate standards for such quasi-
conglomerate inergers. (Emphasis added.) Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria:
Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and Size, 9 VIL. L. REv. 211, 223-24 (1964).
119 Proctor & Gamble Co., TRDE RE. REP., (1961-63 FTC Orders ff 15245, at p.
20257 (FTC June 15, 1961).
220 H. P. REP., supra note 10, at 11.
121Donnem, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity, 8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 283,
284 (1963).
122 Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L. J. 672, 673-
74 (1958). See Note, The Consolidated Foods case: A New Section 7 Test For The
Conglomerate Merger, 49 VA. L. REv. 852, 853 (1963).
123 Consolidated Foods Corp., TR"E REa. REP. (1961-63 FTC Orders) It 16182,
(Nov. 15, 1962); Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964),
reversed on other grounds, 33 U.S.L. Wzxx 4377(U.S. April 28, 1965). In the Su-
preme Court, the applicability of § 7 to conglimerate mergers was conceded by both
parties. 33 U.S.L. WEEK at 4379 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Trade Commission utterances 24 leave no doubt that section 7 does
apply to such mergers. For example, in Proctor & Gamble Co." the
Commission stated:
Under Section 7, as amended, any acquisition whether it be vertical, con-
glomerate or horizontal is unlawful if the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce. 
2 6
The concurrence of the Justice Department in this view is shown by
the actions recently brought against General Motors" 7 and General
Dynamics.' Moreover, the Supreme Court stated in dictum in
United States v. Brown Shoe Co."' that section 7 applies to all mergers
-- "horizontal, vertical and conglomerate."
In Consolidated Foods, the Federal Trade Commission, in an opin-
ion by Commissioner Elman, held that a conglomerate merger violated
section 7 because (1) it altered market structure enough to create a
situation conducive to reciprocity, and (2) there was a reasonable
probability that competition would be substantially lessened thereby.'
The Commission followed the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in
the Brown Shoe Co. case, that the words "may be substantially to
lessen competition" indicated that Congress meant to make a proba-
bility of such lessening sufficient for a violation of section 7.3 Con-
solidated, which processed food and was a wholesaler and retailer of
food products, merged with Gentry, a manufacturer of dehydrated
onion and garlic. The Commission found that Consolidated had at-
tempted to use its purchasing power to require suppliers to buy their
dehydrated onion and garlic from Gentry, and that, without any action
by Consolidated, the reciprocity potential of the conglomerate would
give Gentry an advantage over its competitors.' The opinion did not
hold that all conglomerate mergers creating the potential for reci-
procity were illegal. After an analysis of Gentry's share of the market
in which it sold (in 1958, thirty-five percent of the dehydrated onion
124 E.g., Proctor & Gamble Co., supra note 119, 15245; (FTC June, 1961). Gen-
eral Foods Corp., 3 TRADE REG. RE'. 16,612 (FTC 1963).
12 Supra note 110.
126 In id. at 20257, n.1, the Commission states, "This holding follows both from the
language of the statute and from relevant legislative history."
127 See supra note 47.
128 United States v. General Dynamics Corp. (Complaint under § 1 of the Sherman
Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act), Civil Action No. 62-C.-3686 (S.D.N.Y, Nov. 8,
1962). See HowARD, LEGAL AsPEcTs OF MARKETING 93-94 (1964).
129 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
130 Consolidated Foods Corp., supra note 123, at p. 20,975.
131 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
132 Consolidated Foods Corp., supra note 123 at 20,978-79.
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market and thirty-nine percent of the dehydrated garlic market), and
the proportion of its customers which sold to Consolidated (about
twenty-five per cent),' Commissioner Elman concluded that there
was a reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of competition
in the dehydrated onion and garlic market.13' His opinion also indi-
cated that a trend toward concentration in an industry would be an
important factor, but that in the instant case the industry already was
so concentrated as to leave no room for such a trend to develop.
3
'
The Seventh Circuit reversed because the Commission failed to take
into account post-acquisition evidence showing that despite Consoli-
dated's attempts to implement a reciprocity policy, there was no sub-
stantial impact on the relevant market. 3 Citing the three pre-1938
Federal Trade Commission reciprocity cases discussed earlier in this
paper, the court stated:
Undoubtedly there are situations resulting from acquisitions or mergers
in which business reciprocity has the effect of substantially lessening
competition or can be so utilized. Where the probability of such an effect
arising out of a merger or acquisition is demonstrated the requirements
for application of section 7 are satisfied. But our examination of the
record in the instant proceeding fails to satisfy us that the Commission
sustained its burden of showing that such probability exists. In our
appraisal of the substantiality of the evidence we must take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. . . .And here
ten years of post-acquisition experience-during which Consolidated
attempted overt enforcement of reciprocal buying practice where it
deemed it might be successful-serves to demonstrate that neither the
acquisition of Gentry, in and of itself, nor the overt attempts to use buy-
ing power to influence sellers to Consolidated to purchase from Gentry
resulted in substantial anticompetitive effect.187
Unfortunately the opinion of the Seventh Circuit provides no indica-
tion of when "the probability" of "the effect of substantially lessening
competition" would be demonstrated, or even if it could be demon-
strated at the time of the merger.
Moreover, the majority opinion and the two concurring opinions of
the Supreme Court,3 8 in reversing the Seventh Circuit and reinstating
the decision of the Federal Trade Commission, are disappointing be-
cause they fail to clarify the vital issues of (1) the test for applying
183 Id. at 20,979-80.
184 Id. at 20,980-82
135 Id. at 20,980.
136 Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (1964).
137 Id. at 626.
' 3 33 U.S.L. WzzK 4377 (U.S. April 28, 1965).
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section 7 to conglomerate mergers creating reciprocity power, and
(2) the use of post-acquisition evidence. On the first point, the best
reading of the majority opinion, although arrived at by piecing to-
gether various seemingly independent statements therein, would seem
to be as follows: a conglomerate merger violates section 7 if it gives
rise to a probability of a substantial lessening of competition, and such
a probability will be presumed if the merger (1) involves a company
with a substantial market share and (2) creates a probability of recip-
rocal buying, regardless of the substantality of such buying and regard-
less of the substantiality of the effect of that buying upon competition.
Doubt as to the exact holding arises from the Court's purported
application of the folowing rules: (1) Justice Douglas held "at the
outset" that reciprocity "made possible" by a conglomerate merger
"is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the anti-
trust laws are aimed, if the probable consequence of the acquisition
is to obtain leverage in one field or another." '139 (2) The majority
opinion next stated that such reciprocity "violates § 7, if the prob-
ability of a lessening of competition is shown.'.. It is notable that
this formulation overlooks the fact that section 7 refers to a substantial
lessening of competition.'" (3) Recognition of a substantially re-
quirement appears both in discussing the Commission's findings.. and
in the following excerpt from the latter part of Douglas' opinion:
We do not go so far as to say that any acquisition, no matter how
small, violates §7 if there is a probability of reciprocal buying. Some
situations may amount only to de minimus. But where, as here, the
acquisition is of a company that commands a substantial share of a
market, a finding of probability of reciprocal buying by the Commission,
whose expertise the Congress trusts, should be honored, if there is sub-
stantial evidence to support it.' 43
While the Court never uses the word, a "presumption" of substan-
tial anticompetitive effect seems to be embodied in the language just
quoted. It is submitted that such a presumption is based upon the
false assumption that in all cases any reciprocal purchasing by a com-
pany with a substantial market share has a substantial adverse effect
on competition. Surely there will be situations where a slight amount
of reciprocal purchasing by such a company would have no appreci-
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
14138 Stat. 781 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.§18 (1958).
142 33 U.S.L. WEEK at 4378-79.
143 Id. at 4379.
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able effect on competition. This would especially be so where its com-
petitor also engaged in reciprocity.
Even aside from the logical error inherent in its presumption, the
rule rather unclearly enunciated by the Court still does not provide
the clear guidance to the Commission and lower federal courts which
Justice Stewart, concurring, deemed an important goal.'" What is a
"substantial share of a market"? May the relevant market be either
a buying or a selling market? Is the market share of the acquiring
(as opposed to the acquired) firm relevant? The Court did not furnish
much assistance in answering these questions. In the instant case,
Gentry, at the time of the merger, accounted for about 32 per cent of
the selling market for dehydrated onion and garlic. 45 When its sales
are combined with those of Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., the per-
centage of that market increases to almost 90 per cent. 4 However,
even the 32 per cent figure does not furnish a guideline for substan-
tiality in future cases, since the Court stressed the facts that (1) "the
industry structure was peculiar, Basic being the leader with Gentry
dosing the gap," and (2) "'many buyers have determined that their
source of supply may best be protected by a policy of buying from
two suppliers.' "I" It is submitted that any presumption should be
eliminated, with the substantiality of relevant market shares being
considered along with other criteria in determining whether or not
the merger creates a probability of substantial harm to competition.
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, stated that "the opportunity for
reciprocity is not alone enough to invalidate a merger under §7."48
The touchstone of §7 is the probability that competition will be less-
ened. But before a court takes the drastic step of ordering divestiture,
the evidence must be clear that such a probability exists. 49
Although he found the record "sorely incomplete," Justice Stewart
felt that it "contains just enough to support invalidation of the mer-
ger.M ° However, this support is provided by evidence other than'that
relied upon by the majority 51 Justice Stewart distinguished between
"44 Id. at 4380.
'45 Id. at 4377.
'16 Ibid.
'47 Id. at 4379.
'48 Id. at 4380. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the opinion of justice Stewart,
except for one reservation based upon the need to consider, in finding support for the
Commission's finding, only evidence upon which the commission indicated a reliance.
Id. at 4379.
149 Id. at 4381.
150 Ibid.
Ir"Ibid.
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large processors with nationally known brand names and smaller pro-
cessors; he then concluded that the record is persuasive that most of
the latter "shifted their buying from Basic to Gentry. 152 Having noted
that "these processors are susceptible to the subtle pressures of reci-
procity," whereas the large processors are not, Justice Stewart pro-
ceeded to make the somewhat questionable inference that shifts in
regard to the small processors and the lack of such shifts by the large
ones "seems... sufficient to support the Commission's conclusion that
these shifts were in response to the influence of reciprocity, whether
express or 'tacitly accommodative.' """ Then, apparently to buttress
his conclusion of substantial anticompetitive impact, he noted that
some smaller processors have failed and others have merged with
larger competitors.'54 At least Justice Stewart has made clear what
the majority left in doubt, that "reciprocity-creating mergers are not
per se invalid."' 55
Neither the majority nor either concurring justice considered many
of the situations discussed in this article. For example, no mention
is made of the unfairness, in many instances, of barring mergers cre-
ating reciprocity power when existing firms have such power and its
use has not been declared illegal. It should be noted that this problem
was raised by Mr. Justice White on oral argument, and that counsel
for Consolidated Foods conceded that for purposes of the instant case,
reciprocity violates section 1 of the Serman Act. 5 ' Another vital area,
seemingly ignored by the Court, is that of negative psychological reci-
procity power, both that possessed by existing firms and that created
by conglomerate mergers.
The second major disappointment in the Supreme Court's opinions
in Consolidated Foods is the failure to clarify the use of post-acqui-
sition evidence. The majority concluded that the Seventh Circuit was
not in error in considering such evidence, but "gave too much weight
to it."')7
No group acquiring a company with reciprocal buying opportunities is
entitled to a "free trial" period. To give it such would be to distort the
scheme of §7. ... If the post-acquisition evidence were given conclusive
weight or was allowed to override all probabilities, then acquisitions
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
1"4 Ibid.
"55bid.
15633 U.S.L. WEEK 3302 (U.S. March 16, 1965).
157 33 U.S.L. WEax at 4378.
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would go forward willy-nilly, the parties biding their time until reci-
procity was allowed fully to bloom.158
The Court seems to mean that where there is evidence from which a
reasonable man (or the FTC) could find that a merger gives rise to
a probability of substantial harm to competition, post-acquisition evi-
dence of changes in market shares and/or of unsuccessful efforts to
use reciprocity will not, in all cases, justify a reversal of the Commis-
sion's finding that the merger was invalid. Such evidence is not to be
"given conclusive weight or... allowed to override all probabilities,"
but the Court never says what weight such evidence is to be given (and
presumably it is to be given some since the Court of Appeals did not
err in considering it), nor does the Court indicate the types of prob-
abilities which such evidence may override. Furthermore, the instant
case is not a square holding that contrary post-acquisition evidence
should not override a Commission finding, since here the Court de-
termined that the evidence "tends to confirm, rather than cast doubt
upon the probable anticompetitive effect which the Commission found
the merger would have."" 9
Justice Stewart does not disagree with the weight given such evi-
dence by the Seventh Circuit; rather, he found error in "the gloss it
placed on the statistics and testimony adduced before the hearing
examiner and the Commission.1160 However, he dearly indicates that
the use of post-acquisition data is important to assess the Commission's
finding of probability of impact.16' But, again, this is not a square
holding, because Justice Stewart is "sure that the Commission relied
on post-acquisition factors in issuing its order" (six years after the
merger, as he notes), and "there is no reason why we should rely
on those factors less in assessing the propriety of the Commission's
action 2
These conflicting and confusing attempts to define the use of post-
acquisition evidence leave that question open, along with the following
issue: in what circumstances is a conglomerate merger to be barred?
Is the creation of reciprocity power enough for illegality? Is the cre-
ation of negative psychological reciprocity power? Must the courts
or Commission always await post-acquisition evidence of actual exer-
cise of reciprocity power? Must they await such an indication of the
existence of negative psychological reciprocity power? If such delay
158 Ibid.
159 Id. at 4379. 161 Ibid.
160 Id. at 4381. 162 Ibid.
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is not required, should such evidence be admitted and considered
where it exists?
An argument supporting the view that the Commission (or the dis-
trict court in a case instituted by the Justice Department) should not
bar ab initio a conglomerate merger whose only vice is creation of reci-
procity power can be made as follows: section 7 is infringed only if
there is a probability that competition will be lessened. A decision to
use reciprocity power coercively is an intentional act by corporate
officers. Mere possession of such power should not be sufficient to
support a presumpton that the power will be used. As the Seventh
Circuit stated, "Probability can best be gauged by what the past has
taught.1.3 The Commission has made it clear, in cases attacking con-
glomerate and partial mergers under what has been termed the "deep
pocket theory,"'64 that post-acquisition evidence is useful, and perhaps
even necessary, for evaluating the effects on competition of conglom-
erate mergers.'65 Therefore a conglomerate merger creating reciprocity
power but not otherwise violating section 7 should be allowed, subject
13 329 F.2d at 627.
164 See e.g., Donnem, supra note 107, at 284-86.
165 Proctor & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP., 11 15245 (FTC June, 1961); Reynolds
Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960). But see Hale & Hale, supra note 110, at 188 n.54
(1964): "An interesting controversy has arisen over whether it is permissible in a
merger case to examine evidence of post-acquisition market conditions. Scott Paper
Company, 57 FTC 1415, 1420, 1425-26 (1960), remanded, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962) ;
Comment, The New Law of Mergers, 56 NW. U. L. Ray. 630, 631 (1961)." However,
the Scott case was remanded for more explicit findings in regard to post-acquisition
results, 301 F.2d at 583-84. The Comment cited merely expresses surprise at the need
for post-acquisition evidence "in the light of the weighty case law, literature, and
legislative reports which have expressed and re-expressed the view that § 7 was
worded so as to allow its application to a particular merger at its inception, violation
being predicted on the basis of a probability that competition, at some time in the
future, will be substantially lessened." 56 Nw. U. L. REv. at 630.
In remanding Proctor & Gamble Co. for the hearing examiner to take more exten-
sive post-acquisition evidence, even though he had taken such evidence for the 16-month
period after the conglomerate merger, the Commission stated:
The question in this proceeding thus is whether the proscribed effect may in fact
result from this particular acquisition where the only immediate effect is the replace-
ment of one competitor by another. In making this determination, the same tests
apply as in any other matter coming within the purview of Section 7, but since a
conglomerate acquisition does not have the above-mentioned "automatic" effects of a
vertical or horizontal merger, such a determination is necessarily difficult to make
from a consideration of evidence relating solely to the competitive situation existing
in the relevant market prior to the acquisition and to the pre-merger status of the
acquired and acquiring corporations. Consequently, a consideration of post-acquisi-
tion factors is appropriate.
Proctor & Gamble Co., supra at 20,258.
See United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168 (1964), holding that "the
economic effects of an acquisition are to be measured at!' "the time of suit," and citing
United States v. E.I.du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957). Cf. The
Proctor & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16673, p. 21558, at 21574 (1963) (Elman,
Comm'r.) (discussing § 7 cases) :
The admission of post-acquisition data is proper only in the unusual case in which
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to later divestiture if the new conglomerate does adopt reciprocity
policies and those policies have a substantial impact on the relevant
market.
The contrary argument may be stated as follows: There has never
been a holding that it is impossible to bar a conglomerate merger
ab initio; i.e., no case has ever held that a probability of substantial
lessening of competition cannot be found without post-acquisition evi-
dence. Section 7 is intended to nip in their incipiency mergers which
will probably have a substantial adverse effect on competition. Proof
of the practice of reciprocity will be difficult, since a firm can offer a
variety of plausible reasons for its purchasing decisions. For example,
dependability, customer service, and ease in adjusting disputes may be
put forward in support of purchases from a supplier not offering the
best price or quality. Moreover, reasonable men can differ about the
quality of competing goods. Reciprocity, unlike price-fixing, for in-
stance, does not require any agreements or meeting of conspirators. It
can be unilaterally imposed by a conglomerate with sufficient purchas-
ing power. These difficulties of proof justify barring any merger which
increases the danger of reciprocity. American business has not earned
the presumption that power will not be used illegally. Furthermore,
even if reciprocity could be proven when it is used, a court will be much
more reluctant to order divestiture than it would have been to bar the
merger in the beginning. It is always easier, from the point of view of
cost to corporations and of judicial supervision, to prevent the scram-
bling of the corporate entity eggs than to unmake the merger omelet.
The language used by Justice Douglas in Consolidated Foods cer-
tainly may be construed as envisaging cases in which a conglomerate
merger creating reciprocity power may be barred ab. initio; if some
probabilities of impact may not be overcome by post-acquisition evi-
dence, there is no reason to await its availablity. On the other hand,
the Court did expressly approve use of such data when available.
A recent court of appeals decision may be interpreted as supporting
the view that a conglomerate merger creating reciprocity power should
be barred ab initio. In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.1"6 one of the
reasons given by the Third Circuit for affirming the district court's
the structure of the market has changed radically since the merger-for example,
where the market share of the merged firm has dwindled to insignificance--or in
the perhaps still more unusual case in which the adverse effects of the merger on
competition have already become manifest in the behavior of the firms in the market.
United States v. EFI. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
106 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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grant of a preliminary injunction87 was that the proposed conglomerate
merger would set the stage for three-cornered reciprocity. Ingersoll-
Rand, a large purchaser of steel, planned to acquire three manufactur-
ers of coal mining equipment. Since the steel industry is one of the
largest purchasers of coal, the court felt that the merger would involve
a danger that coal producers, to win the favor of steel companies (in
turn anxious to please Ingersoll-Rand) would purchase their equipment
from the acquired companies. 8 ' The Third Circuit, quoting with ap-
proval from the opinion below, stated:
"It is not overly speculative to assume that the judicious use of its steel-
purchasing power by Ingersoll-Rand could immeasurably increase the
sales by the acquired companies of machinery and equipment to the coal
mining companies which acutely need the continued good will of the
steel industry. Moreover, the mere existence of this purchasing power
might make its conscious employment toward this end unnecessary; the
possession of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated business-
men are quick to see the advantages of securing the good will of the
possessor. Certainly the steel producer who seeks orders from Ingersoll-
Rand may tend to prefer the acquired companies as the source of supply
of equipment used in his 'captive' mines, and the advantages accruing to
him from so favoring the acquired companies would not have to be
pointed out by Ingersoll-Rand.169
While this language is not unambiguous as to the basis for upholding
the preliminary injunction, it is submitted that the better reading is
that in this case it was based largely upon the creation of negative
psychological reciprocity power. In many cases where a conglomerate
merger gives rise to substantial reciprocity power, substantial negative
psychological reciprocity power will also be created. In such situations
there will be no need to face the question of whether or not the merger
should be barred ab initio because it creates substantial reciprocity
power. Indeed, it may be that this question will never have to be faced
at all. But it may well be that cases will arise where the only danger
from the merger lies in the reciprocity power created. In those situa-
tions, despite difficulties of proof, it would seem to be the better rule to
allow the merger and punish use of reciprocity policies when it takes
place. However, this approach must be predicated upon the illegality
of agreed-upon and unilaterally-imposed reciprocity which violates a
rule of reason. Unless that situation is created by construction of one
of the present antitrust statutes or passage of new legislation, a con-
167 218 F. Supp. 530, 555 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
168 320 F.2d at 524. 169 Ibid, quoting 218 F. Supp. at 552.
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glomerate merger creating substantial reciprocity power should be held
to violate section 7, if use of that power probably would substantially
harm competition in a substantial market. When the antitrust laws are
unable to punish actual reciprocity, the benefits to the user from sub-
stantial reciprocity power and the chance that it will be used become so
great that mere creation of the power should allow a presumption that
it probably will be used. It is rash to assume that the power would not
be utilized, at least at that time in the near future when officers of the
new conglomerate would feel that a court would be reluctant to sepa-
rate the now-fused parties to the merger.
If, as will be proposed in Part V df this article, federal legislation is
enacted to make it clear that all agreed-upon and unilaterally-imposed
reciprocity is illegal if violative of a rule of reason, conglomerate
mergers increasing reciprocity power should not be held illegal under
section 7, unless substantial "negative. psychological reciprocity power"
is created.
Since negative psychological reciprocity is virtually impossible to
prove, conglomerate mergers creating power that will induce such con-
duct should be held illegal under section 7, if inducement of such con-
duct will substantially decrease competition in a substantial market.
This result should follow regardless of the legality or illegality of other
types of reciprocity under existing or new federal legislation. Unless
existence of the power is an offense, the large firm L with purchasing
power so great it induces L's suppliers to act as if L had a reciprocity
policy, without any indication by L that it does in fact have such an
attitude, commits no violation. L's suppliers buy from it because they
fear that failure to do so might lead the conglomerate to reduce its
purchases from them. These suppliers, and the courts obviously, have
no way of knowing if their fears are justified. While L, if it reduced
purchases from a supplier S because S bought from L's competitors,
would violate present or new legislation outlawing a unilaterally-im-
posed reciprocity policy, proving that reciprocity underlay the reduc-
tion would be difficult. Carrying the burden of proof approaches the
impossible when L's purchases remain unchanged, and it is alleged that
L's suppliers buy from L because of its substantial negative psycho-
logical reciprocity power.
When the court is looking for such power (or for substantial reci-
procity power, if it is necessary to bar conglomerate mergers creating
it) post-acquisition evidence need not be awaited, but should be utilized
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where available for presentation to the trier of fact. Such evidence is
relevant to, but not conclusive of, the existence of the sought-for power.
If the proof does not disclose the results expected to flow from posses-
sion of such power, the answer may be that the power exists but has
been unexercised. Indeed, it may well be that recent attacks on con-
glomerate mergers will induce new firms so formed to "lie low for a
while, until the heat is off." To hold that any conglomerate merger
substantially increasing negative psychological reciprocity power (or
reciprocity power, where that is the test) is illegal would outlaw most
conglomerate mergers and would disregard the benefits diversification
brings to a firm and to the economy. Diversification (1) increases a
firm's stability by lessening dependence on any one market or product,
and (2) helps the firm secure the best return from deployment of its
capital, its equipment, its research and managerial personnel, and its
labor force. The more varied the jobs and needs a firm has, the more
likely it can fully utilize the human and material capacities it controls.
This higher efficiency increases profit margins, and hopefully competi-
tion will force the firm to pass at least part of this benefit on to the
consumer in lower prices or higher quality goods.
Admittedly diversification, with its attendant benefits, may often be
achieved not only by merger but also by expansion of a company into
a new field. But in many instances the merger route is preferable. For
example, it reduces the need for new capital and guarantees the avail-
ability of skilled specialists and supervisory personnel. Moreover,
merger may be the only way for a firm to diversify into an industry
where (1) existing firms meet present and foreseeable demand and are
relatively efficient producers, (2) those firms have tremendous power
derived from accumulated capital, control of expertise, established
public image, or other sources, and (3) the firm desiring entry cannot
obtain the resources necessary to sustain the long period of low return
required before these advantages can be matched. Furthermore, even
where expansion by the outsider is a possible way to enter an industry,
diversification by merger may have a more beneficial effect on competi-
tion in that industry. For example, this is probably true in cases where
the merger is with a firm which is not an industry leader, and the
merger partner does not have the wherewithal to enter the industry as
a leading company. The merger, as opposed to expansion, will produce
a stronger competitor for the existing leaders. Especially is this so
where the industry is dominated by a few firms.
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These benefits from diversification, the value in many cases of
achieving that diversification by merger, and the fact that almost any
conglomerate merger substantially increases reciprocity power, accen-
tuate the desirability of statutory construction or enactment allowing
the courts to take the view that the creation of reciprocity power does
not-invalidate a conglomerate merger under section 7.
But even if it is deemed necessary to apply section 7 to all conglom-
erate mergers substantially increasing reciprocity power-and in any
event in applying that section to such mergers substantially increasing
negative psychological reciprocity power-the analysis must not stop
with the finding of creation of the requisite power. The probable effect
on competition from the use (presumed) of that power must be evalu-
ated, in light of all the circumstances surrounding the merger. A find-
ing of illegality should be made only if there would be a substantial
decrease in competition in a relevant, substantial market.
The Third Circuit, in Ingersoll-Rand,"° may be groping toward the
approach just suggested, albeit modified by the preliminary injunction
context. Its affirmance of the grant of such an injunction was based
upon a finding that
the record demonstrates abundantly that the acquisitions which Ingersoll-
Rand proposes to make will place under its control companies which have
accounted for and will account for a very substantial share of the total
industry output in three significant lines of commerce. 71
But there was no explicit examination of the structure of other con-
glomerates to see whether or not the contemplated merger would actu-
ally decrease competition. Such an analysis would seem to be impera-
tive.
Diversification may actually increase competition by putting a
single-line firm in the same strong, secure position occupied by some or
all of its diversified competitors, and by bringing already strong firms
into new fields to compete with the strong firms already there. 72 An
170 320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963).
'7," Id. at 524.
172See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962):
We do not. , . intimate, that the mere intrusion of "bigness" into a competitive
economic community otherwise populated by commercial "pygmies" will per se in-
voke the Clayton Act. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328-29.... Each factual situa-
tion under judicial review has its own atmosphere of economic freedom and viability
or lack thereof; occasion may vell arise where an acquisition superficially similar
to the one here condemned by the Commission may be encouraged as necessary to
preserve competition, to maintain production levels adequate to meet consumer
demand or otherwise to produce "countervailing competitive, economic or social
advantages."
Id. at 334.
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absolute bar on diversication by merger is unfair, since in many cases
small, single- or few-line firms could never hope to obtain parity with
diversified competitors, which will remain diversified. Where an exist-
ing company or companies in the industry are similar in structure to the
proposed conglomerate, the merger probably would enable the new
firm to compete, in negative psychological reciprocity (or even in
agreed-upon or unilaterally-imposed reciprocity if it is not illegal), as
well as in other ways, with the established similar conglomerates. In
many instances the result will be to add one more firm to those consti-
tuting an existing oligopoly. But there is no denying that the addition
would increase workable competition.
Barring new conglomerates creating substantial negative reciprocity
power (or reciprocity power, if necessary) is only proper (1) in indus-
tries where no such conglomerate presently exists, or (2) where legis-
lative and judicial steps are taken to break up existing conglomerates
with such potential in the relevant industry.
Breaking up presently-diversified firms with such power would in-
volve thousands of suits, companies, and dislocations of economic struc-
tures deeply entrenched. Such a program would also raise difficult
questions about a right to compensation for resulting losses in cases
where diversity was achieved without violating the then existing anti-
trust laws. Even if such an extensive upheaval were desirable or neces-
sary, the accompanying business resentment of and alienation from the
federal government would prevent this policy from being politically
feasible now, in the present administration, or in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, what would be done to prevent existing firms from diver-
sifying other than by merger? To sharply curtail firms' freedom to
diversify at all would be a momentous extension of governmental regu-
lation of business, a development contrary to cherished notions of prop-
erty rights, free enterprise, and economic efficiency. Moreover, diversi-
fication is often the only way a company in a declining industry, or in
a booming industry in which it can no longer compete successfully, can
continue to operate and hence to employ its workers. Barring diversifi-
cation in such cases is very costly in these times of something less than
full employment.
It should be evident that the price of eliminating all firms, and pre-
venting emergence of new firms, with negative psychological reciprocity
power (or reciprocity power) is much too high to be bearable in the
present political and economic situation. Therefore conglomerate
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mergers should be barred only when they will create such power in a
firm in an industry so structured that the conglomerate's power will
substantially reduce competition in a substantial market. Existing con-
glomerates with such power should be broken up where the cost of
doing so is not prohibitive. Cases in which divestiture probably should
be granted include (1) firms which persistently practice reciprocity to
the extent that they have developed negative psychological reciprocity
power which would survive any cease and desist order, and (2) firms
whose negative psychological reciprocity power and/or reciprocity
power gives them a substantial chance of monopolizing a substantial
market. Concern about a situation of the latter category seems to
underlie the Justice Department's recent action, challenging General
Motors' 1930 acquisition of two locomotive manufacturers. 73 In other
words, existing conglomerates should be broken up when they possess
substantial negative psychological reciprocity power obtained through
illegal conduct or when they threaten monopolization. Otherwise, new
or old firms should be allowed to possess reciprocity power and should
be subject to prosecution -and where necessary, divestiture,-if they
impose or agree upon a reciprocity policy violating a rule of reason
standard. Conglomerate mergers creating substantial negative psycho-
logical reciprocity power should be barred ab initio when such power
probably will substantially reduce competition in a substantial market.
The remaining problem is the legality of negative psychological reci-
procity power developed through legal conduct of an existing firm.
Barring the creation of such power would require the breaking up of
too many firms. Admittedly, the effects such power induces might
be difficult to prove, at least in a static situation where the firm with the
power does not alter its purchasing from various suppliers, and where
the prices and qualities offered by those suppliers remain constant.
However, in an expanding, dynamic economy, needs of the powerful
purchaser are always shifting, as are the prices and qualities of present
goods offered by its suppliers, and the nature of goods available on the
market to serve various purposes. New products and processes are
constantly being developed. If the big purchaser practices reciprocity,
that fact may be capable of proof in many cases where negative psycho-
logical reciprocity power has a substantial adverse effect on competi-
tion. Competitors with similar power will often prevent one firm with
that power from seriously harming workable competition. Where such
173 See note 47 supra.
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harm approaches monopolization, the powerful firm should be broken
up. But some substantial negative psychological reciprocity will be
impossible to prove, and will allow the possessor to expand at the ex-
pense of small competitors. Tolerating its existence is a price that must
be paid to allow the benefits of diversification, to avoid putting a
straight jacket on the business community, and to take into account
political realities.
V. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
As has been suggested by Mr. Hausman, in a recent Comment in the
Harvard Law Review,' federal legislation making reciprocity a crimi-
nal offense and a civil antitrust violation is a possible solution to the
present uncertain and probably inadequate status of reciprocity under
the antitrust laws. The merits and nature of proposed legislation must
depend upon three interrelated problems: (1) the desirability of a rule
making reciprocity illegal per se, without any consideration of its rea-
sonableness; (2) the difficulties, in at least some situations, of proving
that reciprocity exists, and the price that must be paid for presumptions
easing the problem of proof; (3) the difficulty in providing adequate
remedies to prevent continued violations, without destroying economi-
cally useful diversified corporate structures. The legal effect of
reciprocity should be brought into line with the economic effect, which
is the same whether or not the reciprocal buying and selling is pursuant
to an agreement or is the result of the unilaterally applied policies of
one firm.
As has been previously discussed, reciprocity does have an anticom-
petitive effect, even where the goods it induces a firm to purchase are
equal in price and quality to any available from the seller's competitors.
Reciprocity denies these competitors a fair chance to compete with the
seller in service, dependability, and the other factors which in a work-
ably competitive economy would enable a purchaser to distinguish be-
tween offers equal in price and quality. Reciprocity also raises an extra
barrier to changing suppliers. When it induces payment of a higher
price or acceptance of poorer quality, reciprocity raises the purchaser's
costs, thereby lowering his profit margin at any given price and prob-
ably raising the ultimate price paid or quality of goods received by the
consumer in regard to goods made by the purchaser or made using his
goods.
174 Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873,
885-86 (1964).
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While its economic effects appear to make it desirable to render reci-
procity illegal per se, other factors indicate the benefit of having a rule
of reason. The rationale of the adversary system is that only in that
way can the arguments for each side be best analyzed and presented.
A legislative determination that all reciprocity is bad, with no counter-
vailing benefits, assumes that the legislature would be able to investi-
gate fully all the situations in which reciprocity operates. Some coun-
tervailing considerations are evident. For example, reciprocity seems
better than a merger of the two firms doing the reciprocating, and
there has never been any holding that conglomerate mergers are illegal
per se. A reciprocal relationship gives each party an added incentive
to comply fully with the terms of all agreements with the other party
who can retaliate in the event of default instead of having to.resort to
judicial remedies. Reciprocity may well be the result of a traditional
course of dealing based in large part on friendship between executives
in the two firms, who realize their relationship enables all sorts of in-
formal adjustments of their contracts as circumstances require. Reci-
procity may also be based, at least in part, on psychological factors of
the type mentioned earlier in connection with David Ogilvy's practice
of purchasing the products his agency advertises.
Reciprocity reduces selling expenses and increases certainty, as has
already been discussed. Accounting is simplified if the number of sup-
pliers is kept small. Further investigation by experts, within the con-
texts of concrete fact situations, probably will reveal more benefits
flowing from reciprocity. The aspects already mentioned would be
likely to be enough to outweigh the harm caused by reciprocity, in at
least some situations, so that a rule of reason rather than of per se
illegality should be adopted.
Problems of proof and remedy also support this conclusion. If reci-
procity were made illegal per se, in the absence of memoranda - or em-
ployee disclosure, a firm could not be proven guilty of reciprocity
where it bought from only one or some of the firms offering the best
price and quality in a particular type of goods. In many cases reciproc-
ity may be company policy, but in the absence of significant impact on
competition, it will be difficult to prove. Service, reliability and various
other explanations can be given for the company's choice of suppliers.
Where there is a significant impact on competition, the reciprocity prac-
tices, hopefully, will be sufficiently extensive and will require such
careful record keeping as to ease the proof problems. It would seem to
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
be poor legislative policy to outlaw that which has little effect, may have
benefit, and is difficult to prove. Also, even if reciprocity were found to
exist in this type of situation, and the court ordered the defendant to
abstain from using reciprocity in the future, how is violation of that
order to be proven? It would be unfair for a court to order a company
to purchase from all suppliers who offer the same price and quality.
There are legitimate reasons for preferring more reliable firms, for
example.
Severe prison terms and fines for individuals and fines for firms
which violate the law against reciprocity, with more severe penalties for
violation of a court order enjoining future violations, will deter some
from using reciprocity. However, the problems of proving violations
and the pressures of competition probably will lead to violations by
many officers and firms. Furthermore, since no intercorporate con-
spiracy is needed for a firm to adopt a reciprocity policy, officers are
more likely to think they can escape detection than in a price-fixing
conspiracy, where meetings between officers of different firms seem
necessary."'
One other possible technique would be for a court, upon finding that
a firm uses reciprocity policies, to order that firm to separate completely
its buying and selling activities, with no knowledge of customers given
to those who purchase, and no knowledge of suppliers given to those
who sell. The difficulty with this type of decree is that in any firm, at
some level, there must be officers directing the entire business enter-
prise, and these persons must know about both sales and purchases.
They, in turn, can tell both the sales and purchasing departments whom
to approach.
Therefore, the benefits of reciprocity, the problems of proof, and
the difficulties of remedy indicate the desirability of a rule of reason.
Its exact phrasing will be difficult. Two major alternatives are (1) a
detailed, precisely described test or series of tests for defining unreason-
able reciprocity, and (2) a broadly drawn standard leaving wide discre-
tion to the courts in applying it in particular cases. Specific tests have
the advantage of certainty, but risk injustice because their generality
ignores facts peculiar to particular industries or disparate situations
within an industry. A flexible rule will leave businessmen in undesir-
able confusion as to what conduct is permissible. Perhaps the best test
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would be a mixture of the two alternatives: a broad test supplemented
by more specific rebuttable presumptions. For example, the statute
might state that reciprocity shall be illegal when it has an anticompeti-
tive effect that is unreasonable when viewed in light of the size of the
market affected, the benefits derived from the reciprocity, the prices
and qualities of the goods purchased, and any other factors which the
court deems relevant. The statute could then state that all reciprocity
agreements are presumed to be illegal and so are reciprocal purchases
obtained by threats of withdrawing orders or letting it be known that
your firm follows a reciprocal policy in buying. The defendant should
be given the burden of proof in regard to the existence of countervailing
factors justifying its use of reciprocity.
Experience with this type of statute may eventually indicate that
much more precisely defined rule of reason presumptions or even an
illegal per se test is desirable. At first, it seems wise to enter this rela-
tively virgin field of antitrust enforcement with plenty of leeway for
courts to decide cases in accordance with the factors developed in the
extensive investigations promoted by the adversary system in regard
to the particular fact patterns appearing in individual cases. Such an
approach will require extremely complicated trials, since in most reci-
procity cases at least two markets are involved-those in which each of
the parties involved sells the goods he induces the other to purchase.
When reciprocity occurs in regard to a variety of goods, many markets
are involved. However, the evolution of the best rule based upon a
searching investigation of the reciprocity area in a variety of cases
justifies the expenditures of government funds and judicial time neces-
sary to conduct such complicated trials. Moreover, while Congress is
unlikely to open this hole in the federal purse, recognition should be
given to the fact that these cases are to be brought in an uncertain area
for the benefit of the whole country, and therefore Congress might well
consider paying the costs of attorneys fees and other expenses incurred
by the defendants in the early reciprocity cases under the proposed
statute, at least as long as the defendants did not specifically intend to
unreasonably harm competition.
Additional federal legislation is not needed to deal with conglomerate
mergers increasing reciprocity power and negative psychological reci-
procity power. Such mergers can be controlled adequately under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. However, federal legislation making clear
the invalidity of all agreed-upon and unilaterally-imposed reciprocity
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violative of a rule of reason will alter the recommended application of
section 7. Conglomerate mergers creating substantial negative psycho-
logical reciprocity power will still have to be nipped in the bud; other
conglomerate mergers increasing reciprocity potential can be allowed,
subject to later prosecutions for actual use of reciprocity violating a
rule of reason.
Such a statutory scheme, buttressed by the interpretations of existing
statutes which have been advocated in this article, will best serve the
dual purposes of maintaining workable competition and avoiding undue
regulation of business entities and practices.
